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  Water distribution systems, electrical power transmission systems, and other civil 
infrastructure systems are essential to the smooth and stable operation of regional 
economies.  Since the functions of such infrastructure systems often are inter-dependent, 
the systems sometimes suffer unforeseen functional disruptions.   For example, the 
widespread power outage due to the malfunction of an electric power substation, which 
occurred in the northeastern United States and parts of Canada in August 2003, 
interrupted the supply of water to several communities, leading to inconvenience and 
economic losses.  The sequence of such failures leading to widespread outages is referred 
to as a cascading failure.  Assessing the vulnerability of communities to natural and man-
made hazards should take the possibility of such failures into account. 
In seismic risk assessment, the risk to a facility or a building is generally specified 
by one of two basic approaches: through a probabilistic seismic hazard analysis (PSHA) 
and a stipulated scenario earthquake (SE).  A PSHA has been widely accepted as a basis 
for design and evaluation of individual buildings, bridges and other facilities.  However, 
the vulnerability assessment of distributed infrastructure facilities requires a model of 
spatial intensity of earthquake ground motion.  Since the ground motions from a PSHA 
represent an aggregation of earthquakes, they cannot model the spatial variation in 
intensity.  On the other hand, when a SE-based analysis is used, the spatial correlation of 
seismic intensities must be properly evaluated. 
  This study presents a new methodology for evaluating the functionality of an 
infrastructure system situated in a region of moderate seismicity considering functional 
interactions among the systems in the network, cascading failure, and spatial correlation 
 xvii 
of ground motion.  The functional interactions among facilities in the systems are 
modeled by fault trees, and the impact of cascading failures on serviceability of a 
networked system is computed by a procedure from the field of operations research 
known as a shortest path algorithm.  The upper and lower bound solutions to spatial 




CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
 
Commerce and public health and safety depend strongly on the proper functioning 
of civil infrastructure systems, including electrical power transmission, water and gas 
distribution, and public transportation systems.  The serviceability of such systems can be 
measured as the ratio of customers in an area that can be served to customers requiring 
service within that area.  If the serviceability of these infrastructure systems is impaired 
or destroyed as a consequence of extreme natural events such as hurricanes or 
earthquakes, accidents, or deliberate man-made incidents, business and industrial 
activities in the community serviced are interrupted, productivity is diminished or lost 
and social welfare is impaired.   The recovery period is longer when the systems are 
severely damaged, and the losses increase exponentially as the period required to fully 
recover infrastructure serviceability lengthens (Tierney, 2000).   Furthermore, the 
demands placed on an infrastructure system, as well as the capacity of components and 
systems to withstand those demands, are highly uncertain.  Accordingly, a probability-
based vulnerability assessment of infrastructure systems is necessary to forecast the likely 
impact of a disaster on their operating requirements, the degree of damage or diminished 
functionality in key system components, and the social impact of the disaster on the 
community served.  This vulnerability assessment is one basis for estimating probable 
losses and the impact of diminished functionality on the affected community.   
Civil infrastructure systems that may be impacted by a natural or man-made 
disaster consist of many interconnected components and delivery systems.  These 
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components may be widely distributed over an urban area and may sustain different 
levels of damage when subjected to an extreme event.   For example, a municipal water 
system includes water storage tanks, pumping stations and pipelines.  Electrical power 
systems in an urban area may have one or more generation plants, numerous substations, 
and extensive transmission and distribution lines.  Furthermore, civil infrastructure 
systems often are functionally interdependent, in the sense that the proper functioning of 
one system requires service from other systems.   One familiar example of the impact of 
functional dependence between infrastructure systems on their operating characteristics is 
furnished by the widespread power outage in the northeastern United States and parts of 
Canada in August, 2003.  During that power outage, water systems in Cleveland, OH 
(and other municipalities) failed to operate because the pumping stations required 
electrical power, even though the water system itself did not sustain any physical damage 
(Cascos et al., 2004).  More recently, as a result of a power outage in Tokyo, Japan on 
August 14, 2006 caused by an industrial accident, urban road traffic networks were 
affected due to traffic light failures at more than 260 places, passenger travel on the 
subway system was impaired, and the Tokyo Stock Exchange was forced to cease its 
foreign exchange operations (CNN.COM, 2006).  Earthquakes are likely to be a source of 
such failures.  In the Mid Niigata Prefecture, Japan earthquakes of 2004 (four 
earthquakes of Japanese magnitudes 5.8, 5.9, 6.4 and 6.5 occurred in 40 minuets), about 
260 houses in Yamakoshi village lost electrical power; power transmission could not be 
restored for an extended period because transportation networks were severely damaged 
by the earthquakes.  In this village, the supply of potable water was also damaged; the 
repair of the damaged potable water supply system was delayed for four months because 
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the other infrastructure systems on which it depended were severely damaged.  Many 
similar situations were reported after this earthquake (Niigata Prefecture, 2004). 
In many parts of the world, earthquakes pose a major threat to the operation of 
civil infrastructure systems.  Seismic fragility and vulnerability assessment are key 
ingredients of decision-making for mitigating earthquake risks to civil infrastructure in an 
urban area.   In recent years, such assessments have been performed for networked civil 
infrastructure systems that provide essential services - natural gas, water, electric power, 
telecommunications and transportation - to urban communities.  When the fragility or 
functionality of a component or facility in a networked infrastructure system or the 
vulnerability of the system as a whole are considered, the performance of a facility in that 
networked system may be affected by the functionality of other facilities and connecting 
elements in interfacing systems.  For example, during the electrical power blackout of 
August, 2003 noted above, some undamaged electrical power substations were unable to 
deliver power to a service area because other substations in the electrical grid on which 
they depended lost functionality (US-Canada Power System Outage Task Force, 2004).   
Such failures are referred to as cascading failures (Rinaldi et al., 2001; Rinaldi, 2004). 
Earthquake hazards used in vulnerability assessment of civil infrastructure 
systems generally are specified using two basic approaches: through a probabilistic 
seismic hazard analysis (PSHA) (McGuire, 1995) or scenario earthquake (SE) based 
seismic analysis.  In a PSHA, the seismic hazard is described by a complimentary 
cumulative distribution function defining the probability of exceeding specific earthquake 
intensities.  This probabilistically stated seismic hazard reflects the aggregated effect of 
possible earthquakes in proximity to a site, weighted by the probability of occurrence of 
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each earthquake (McGuire, 1995 and 2004).   Probabilistic seismic hazard maps that 
display contours of seismic intensities corresponding to peak ground acceleration or 
velocity (PGA, PGV) or spectral parameters at specific return periods are published by 
the United States Geological Survey (U.S. Geological Survey, 2002b).  The intensities 
from these uniform hazard maps are used in building design (Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, 2004; American Society of Civil Engineers, 2005).   A PSHA is 
particularly suited for designing individual facilities because the aggregated effects of all 
seismic events affecting the facility can be represented at a probabilistically stipulated 
level of the seismic hazard in the governing codes and regulatory documents (e.g., 2% 
probability of exceedance in 50 years).   On the other hand, no single earthquake can 
generate the spatial distribution of seismic intensity that is reflected in the probabilistic 
seismic hazard map, as the mapped contours represent the aggregated effects of 
numerous earthquakes.   This fact does not pose a problem when only one facility is 
analyzed or designed, since a risk assessment of that one facility does not require 
information on the spatial distribution of seismic intensities.  However, when the damage 
or risk to a spatially distributed networked infrastructure system must be assessed, 
information regarding the spatial distribution of seismic intensities is also important 
(Eguchi, 1991b; Chang et al., 2000).  This impact is difficult to assess on the basis of a 
PSHA because information on the spatial distribution of ground motion intensity due to 
one (severe) earthquake is lost in the process of aggregation on which the uniform hazard 
contours are based.  
In contrast to a PSHA, a SE-based seismic hazard analysis is aimed at 
investigating the impact of a specific earthquake (usually stipulated in terms of 
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magnitude and epicenter) on a facility or group of facilities.  Such a specification of 
seismic hazard also is useful in communicating the hazard or risk, especially in 
explaining seismic risk to civil infrastructure systems to public decision-makers who 
seldom are familiar with the mathematical concepts that underlie a PSHA but understand 
the concept of an earthquake magnitude from exposure in the popular media.      
Assessments of civil infrastructure network performance during and after an 
earthquake often are based on a postulated scenario earthquake (SE).  A scenario-based 
seismic risk analysis, despite its conditional nature, avoids some of the conceptual and 
practical difficulties in applying a probabilistic seismic hazard analysis (PSHA) (Tierney, 
2000) to evaluate network serviceability (Shinozuka et al., 1992; Hwang et al, 1998; 
Cascos et al., 2004).  Among the particular challenges in scenario-based risk analysis are 
modeling the effect of spatial correlation in ground motion intensity in the absence of 
information on seismic wave propagation and local site conditions, and evaluating the 
impact of this spatial correlation on response of distribution elements that are found in 
distributed civil infrastructures systems.  Furthermore, the effect of infrastructure 
interdependency must be properly modeled and evaluated when the serviceability of 
infrastructure systems are assessed. 
1.1 Research Objectives 
 Experience during and following past earthquakes has clearly shown that the 
residual serviceability of a civil infrastructure system is strongly dependent on the 
residual serviceability of other infrastructure systems that interface with it.  More 
specifically, once infrastructure systems have become damaged or their function has been 
impaired, other interfacing infrastructure systems can lose their serviceability though they 
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are not physically damaged.  Furthermore, stochastically dependent seismic intensities 
lead to stochastically dependent damage in infrastructure systems, and facilities and 
distribution elements, yielding damage situation nor forseen from ordinary seismic 
assessments which have not considered stochastic dependence.  For example, if a seismic 
intensity at one site is much higher than estimated by its epicentral distance and local soil 
condition, seismic intensities around the site might be higher than estimated, and this 
yields more severe damage situation than would otherwise be expected. 
The proposed research introduces a new methodology for assessing serviceability 
of infrastructure systems exposed to earthquake hazard.   The distinctive features of this 
methodology are its consideration of interactions between infrastructure systems at risk, 
its inclusion of cascading failures from components within the infrastructure system, and 
its accounting for spatially correlated seismic intensities in the affected region.   The 
applicability of probabilistic seismic hazard analysis to a spatially distributed 
infrastructure system and limitations in comparison to a scenario analysis are assessed.  
To illustrate the methodology, a vulnerability assessment is conducted of the municipal 
water system in an urban area of the Central United States exposed to moderate seismic 
risk. 
This new serviceability assessment methodology leads to improvements in the 
residual serviceability estimation that can be utilized in decision making regarding design 
and retrofit plan of infrastructure systems. 
1.2 Organization of Dissertation 
This dissertation is divided into seven chapters.  Chapter 1 introduces the subject 
and identifies the major research issues, and presents the research objectives.  Chapter 2 
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reviews existing research methods in the field of operations research and system 
reliability that might be used for serviceability assessment of infrastructure systems and 
for evaluating interdependency effects among infrastructure systems.  Chapter 3 presents 
the approaches for modeling infrastructure interdependencies, illustrating the theories and 
algorithms that are used in the following chapters with simple examples.  Chapter 4 
illustrates alternatives for characterizing the seismic demands on infrastructure systems.  
Probabilistic seismic hazard analysis and the scenario based seismic hazard analysis are 
introduced, in the context of describing the earthquake threat on a distributed system.  
Attenuation equations for the peak ground acceleration and the peak ground velocity, the 
local soil amplification factors and the spatial correlation of seismic intensities are 
introduced.  Chapter 5 considers the applicability of the probabilistic seismic hazard 
analysis approach to a spatially distributed infrastructure system.  The simple network 
models are used to identify situations in which probabilistic seismic hazard analysis can 
reasonably be applied and to explain its limitations through quantitative examples.  
Chapter 6 illustrates the new serviceability assessment methodology of interdependent 
infrastructure systems subjected to spatially correlated seismic demands, through a case 
study involving the water distribution system and the electrical power transmission 
system in Shelby County, TN.  Easily computed upper and lower bounds on 
serviceability ratio under the spatially correlated seismic intensities are developed.  
Chapter 7 illustrates the serviceability assessment of infrastructure systems under uniform 
seismic intensities.  By applying the probabilistic seismic hazard analysis to the real 
network system, the deficiencies in use of probabilistic seismic hazard analysis for this 
purpose are illustrated.  Using a deaggregation of the probabilistic seismic hazard, the 
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serviceability of infrastructure systems is evaluated at several return periods.  Chapter 8 
illustrates the impact of epistemic uncertainty on the serviceability assessment are 
illustrated.  Using event tree models, the effect of epistemic uncertainty due to the choice 
of modeling parameters are evaluated.  Furthermore, the sensitivities of water distribution 
and electrical power transmission systems to the modeling parameters are evaluated.  
Chapter 9 summarizes the major research findings and suggests future avenues for 





CHAPTER 2  
SERVICEABILITY ASSESSMENT OF INFRASTRUCTURE 
SYSTEMS 
 
Methodologies to analyze the serviceability of an infrastructure system following 
an extreme natural event, such as an earthquake, have been improved in recent years and 
have become more efficient and sophisticated as a number-crunching power of personal 
computers has improved.  In addition, some research recognizes the important effects of 
infrastructure interdependency when serviceability of an infrastructure system is 
analyzed.  However, most of the research does not consider the functional interaction 
among infrastructure systems.  Rather, it considers financial interaction among the 
monetary losses due to the lost performance of infrastructure systems and underestimates 
the total monetary loss since the monetary loss due to a single infrastructure system must 
be affected by the functional interaction among infrastructure systems. 
In this section, previous research applicable to civil infrastructure network 
analysis is reviewed, with the goal of identifying the current state-of-the-art and research 
issues and challenges that must be addressed.  This review lays the groundwork for, and 
clarifies the objectives of, the proposed research.  
2.1 Review of Previous Work 
 Many assessment methodologies applicable to the serviceability of infrastructure 
systems have been proposed.  These methodologies are classified as follows:  
• To model an infrastructure system,  
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• To assess the serviceability of an infrastructure system, and 
• To evaluate effects of infrastructure interdependency. 
During these steps, uncertainties of parameters such as seismic intensities or failure 
events of components in an infrastructure system should be integrated properly.  In this 
section, prior research achievements are reviewed, and issues which have not been dealt 
with previously and are to be addressed in this study are presented. 
 
(1) Modeling an infrastructure system 
An infrastructure system is a collection of many components such as facilities and 
distribution elements.  Each facility or distribution element has its own structural 
characteristics and its own independent role to maintain a function of the infrastructure 
system.   While an office building or a bridge is also a collection of components, the 
major characteristic of an infrastructure system not shared by an office building or bridge 
is that its components are spatially distributed over a large region, and key components 
may located at some distance from one another.  For example, a hydro-power generation 
station is located close to a water dam in a valley; electrical power is transmitted through 
transmission lines and substations to urban areas located some distance from the hydro-
power generation plant.  Thus, the modeling approach must take these distinct features 
into account. 
To address this modeling problem, Satyanarayana and Wood (1985), Wagner et 
al. (1988a and 1988b) and Quimpo et al. (1997) used graph theory to model an 
infrastructure system.  In these studies, an infrastructure system was modeled using edges 
and vertices. The edge represents components of an infrastructure system such as a 
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facility or a distribution element, and the vertex represents a connecting point which has 
perfect reliability.  When two components such as a water pumping station and a water 
pipe are physically connected, the two edges, which represent the water pumping station 
and the water pipe, are connected at a vertex.  Conversely, when two components (e.g., 
an electrical power substation and a water dam) are not physically connected, the two 
edges representing the two components do not share a vertex.  Later, Yang and Shaoping 
(2003) also used a graph to model an infrastructure system although the methodology 
was not clearly mentioned. 
Recently, Dueñas-Osario (2005), Dueñas-Osario et al. (2006a and 2006b) also 
modeled an infrastructure system using graph theory.  In contrast with the earlier studies 
mentioned above, a vertex represented a facility such as an electrical power substation, 
water pumping station or a water storage tank, and an edge represented a distribution 
element such as a water pipe or an electrical power transmission line.  When a 
distribution element and a facility are physically connected, the vertex and one end of the 
edge are connected.  Compared with the modeling approach proposed by Satyanarayana 
and Wood (1985), Wagner et al. (1988a and 1988b) and Quimpo et al. (1997), the 
modeling approach proposed by Dueñas-Osario (2005), Dueñas-Osario et al. (2006a and 
2006b) is more realistic since an infrastructure system in the real world is composed of 
vertices (facilities) and edges (distribution elements) in broad perspective. 
 
(2) Assessing the serviceability of an infrastructure system 
Seismic damage to a single building can be estimated from a fragility curve of the 
building and knowledge of the seismic intensity at the site of the building.  Similarly, the 
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seismic damage to each facility comprising an infrastructure system, such as a water 
storage tank, an electrical power generating plant or an electrical power substation, can 
be assessed by an appropriate fragility curve and the seismic intensity at the site of the 
component.  For a distribution element such as a water pipe, the pipe break density, 
which is defined as the number of pipe break per unit pipe length (e.g. 1,000 feet), is 
dependent on seismic intensity distributed over the length of the distribution element.  
Thus, the seismic damage level of components of an infrastructure system can be 
computed individually.  However, the seismic damage level (or residual serviceability 
after an earthquake) of an entire infrastructure system cannot be computed simply from 
the fragility curves and seismic intensities which are used to evaluate the seismic damage 
to each component.  For example, though a water pumping station may not be damaged 
after an earthquake, it may lose its function if water cannot be provided because water 
storage tanks and/or water pipes that supply the pump are damaged and lose their 
functions.  Evaluating this type of failure (cascading failure) has been one of the main 
thrusts of the present study. 
Many methodologies for the serviceability assessment of an infrastructure system 
have been proposed.  Satyanarayana and Wood (1985), Wagner et al. (1988a and 1988b) 
and Quimpo et al. (1997) used the techniques of series reduction, parallel reduction and 
polygon-chain reduction.  By applying these techniques, a subsystem, which is a portion 
of an entire model of an infrastructure system can be replaced a single component whose 
failure probability is same as the failure probability of the original subsystem.  When a 
subsystem is modeled as a polygon, this also can be replaced by a pure series system or a 
single component, which is called the polygon-chain reduction (Satyanarayana and 
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Wood, 1985).  By continuing the replacements, the entire model of an infrastructure 
system becomes a pure parallel system, a pure series system, or a single component 
which have the same reliability as that of an entire infrastructure system.  Though this 
approach leads the correct serviceability of an infrastructure system, finding a polygon 
which can be replaced by a chain is very difficult and only one component can be 
analyzed at one time.  Thus, the computation of the serviceability of an entire 
infrastructure system containing many components can be time-consuming and 
inefficient. 
Pires et al. (1996) and Ang et al. (1996) assessed the serviceability of an 
infrastructure system using a matrix formulation of component connectivity.  In this 
method, a coefficient ai,j of matrix A represents the connection between two components i 
and j.  When two components i and j are physically and directly connected, ai,j = 1; 
otherwise ai,j = 0.  An element  aki,j of the matrix Ak, which is the matrix of A to the kth 
power, represents that component i is connected with component j though the k-1 
components that may exist between two components i and j.  Thus, the connectivity 
matrix for the system, C, which is the sum of matrices A, A2, … , An, where n is the 
number of components, represents whether an arbitrary pair of two components within 
the system is connected (ci,j ≠ 0) or disconnected (ci,j = 0).  In contrast to the polygon-
chain reduction technique, this approach can analyze the serviceability of an entire 
infrastructure system at once, once the coefficients of matrix A are determined.  
However, the process must be applied many times to evaluate a reliable estimate of 
serviceability.   
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Kuwata and Takada (2003) evaluated the water availability at a hospital using a 
probabilistic approach.  The probability of connectivity between the water reservoir and 
the hospital was determined as the product of failure probabilities of the water reservoir, 
water pipes connecting the reservoir and the hospital, and internal building utility 
systems, under the assumption that the three failure events are statistically independent.  
This approach can be useful if the connections among facilities and distribution elements 
are purely in series.  Other cases were not discussed in their study. 
In the graph theory approach of Dueñas-Osario et al (2005, 2006a and 2006b), 
when a component loses its functionality, the vertex or the edge is removed from the 
original graph which represents a non-damaged infrastructure system.  The probability 
that a node is removed is computed using the fragility curve of a component, while the 
probability that an edge is removed is equal to the probability that a distribution element 
has at least one leakage or break.  The serviceability ratio of the infrastructure system is 
defined as the connectivity loss, which is computed as the ratio of the number of paths 
between supply facilities and demand facilities within a damaged infrastructure system to 
the number of the paths within the same infrastructure system prior to damage.  
Following this approach, the infrastructure system can be modeled as a graph by simply 
replacing facilities and distribution elements by edges and nodes, respectively, of a graph.   
The shape of this graph directly reflects the shape of the infrastructure system.  However, 
since the graph theory approach has not been commonly used in civil engineering, its 
results are difficult to integrate with the results of previous research.    
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Many studies which use computer applications have been proposed.  However, 
the methodologies to analyze the connectivity were not described in detail (e.g., Chang et 
al., 1996; Shinozuka et al., 1998; Jin et al., 2002; Dong and Shinozuka, 2003). 
 
(3) Evaluating effects of infrastructure interdependency 
 In addition to the fact that functions of components within an infrastructure 
system are dependent on each other, the functions of infrastructure systems are also 
interdependent.  For example, electrical power is needed to operate a water distribution 
system properly, and water is needed to operate an electrical power generating plant to 
generate electrical power by watery vapor.  To ignore such infrastructure 
interdependencies results in a non-conservative estimation of the serviceability of an 
infrastructure system.   
 Rinaldi et al. (2001), Peerenboom et al. (2002), Gillette et al. (2002), NERC 
(2004) and Fedora (2004) noted the importance of infrastructure interdependencies on 
economic, industrial and social activities. Rinaldi et al. (2001) and Peerenboom et al. 
(2002) classified infrastructure interdependencies based on relationships among 
infrastructure systems (the details will be discussed in Chapter 3).   Chang et al. (1996) 
also noted the potential importance of infrastructure interdependency among the water 
distribution, the gas distribution and the electrical power transmission systems in Shelby 
County, TN, but did not determine the quantitative effects of infrastructure 
interdependency on serviceability.   The research focusing on the quantitative effects of 
infrastructure interdependency on infrastructure system serviceability is limited.   
  
 16 
 The study by Robert (2004) is one of the first that attempted to assess network 
serviceability considering system interdependency effects directly.  Interdependency 
among systems was modeled by direct links and indirect links.  A direct link represents 
physical attachment of two facilities.  Examples of direct links are water pipes and 
electrical power transmission lines.  An indirect link represents a functional connection 
which “is not specifically planned or constructed but emerges from the dispersion of a 
substances coming from a lifeline network.  This dispersion triggers a modification of the 
area in which other networks function, therefore creating a new link” (Robert, 2004).   An 
example of an indirect link is the loss of function of a water pumping station due to 
electrical power unavailability.  Though Robert’s study recognizes the existence of 
infrastructure interaction effects and their importance when serviceability of a lifeline 
network is analyzed, it is applied to a hydroelectric power network, which is composed of 
a hydroelectric power generating station, a spillway, a dam, a storage basin and a river, 
and a power distribution network, which is composed of electrical power substations and 
transmission lines.  The details of the methodology used to analyze the effect of 
infrastructure interdependencies were not reported. 
 In the graph theory approach of Dueñas-Osario et al. (2005, 2006a and 2006b), 
the probability that a node or an edge is removed is determined by not only the 
component fragility or the leakage or break ratio of a distribution element but also the 
probability that a facility did not receive commodities which are needed to maintain the 
function of the nodes or the edges.  For example, the edge representing a water pumping 
station was removed when the electrical power was lost. 
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 Many studies (e.g., Chang and Seligson et al., 1996; FEMA, 1997 and 2003; 
Rose, et al., 1997; Shinozuka, et al., 1997 and 1998) have considered financial losses 
incurred due to loss of serviceability arising from system interdependency effects using 
Input-Output (I-O) analysis (Leontief, 1951 and 1986; Haimes and Jiang, 2001; Haimes 
et al, 2005a and 2005b).  This approach is necessary to compute the total monetary losses 
to industries damaged by an earthquake.  However, none of the studies to date using I-O 
analysis have considered the additional serviceability loss due to infrastructure 
interdependency.  Accordingly, such studies may underestimate the total monetary loss.  
 
(4) Analysis of Uncertainty 
 The process of serviceability assessment of an infrastructure system involves 
numerous uncertainties.  Earthquakes of sufficient magnitude to severely damage 
infrastructure systems are relatively infrequent.  Data on performance of engineered 
systems are limited, mathematical regression models are used in lieu of physical models, 
and expert opinions substitute for data when empirical data are unavailable.  For 
example, attenuation relationships that describe seismic intensities at a site in terms of 
magnitude and epicentral distance from the seismic source are computed from regression 
analysis of historical ground motion records, in which the mathematical form of the 
attenuation relationship is based on expert opinion (e.g., Boore, 1987 and 2003).  The 
local soil amplification factors, the fragility curves of facilities and the leakage/break 
ratio of distribution elements are also evaluated by similar approaches.  Thus, such 
mathematical relationships lead to estimates of mean or median values and uncertainties 
which reflect the deviation of real value from the estimates.    Most studies presented 
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above did not consider or discuss such uncertainties.  In addition, no study exists which 
considers the impact of spatial correlation of seismic intensities over a large area on the 
functioning of distributed networks within that area.  The importance of spatially 
correlated seismic intensities and uncertainty modeling for network serviceability 
assessment is examined at length in Chapters 4, 6 and 7 of this dissertation. 
2.2 Critical Appraisal of Existing Studies 
The review of previous research studies of direct and indirect losses resulting 
from earthquake damage to civil infrastructure systems has identified the following 
research issues:   
• Serviceability of infrastructure systems currently is measured without considering 
infrastructure interdependency effects in the most of existing studies.  As a result, 
the estimate of the serviceability of an infrastructure system after an earthquake 
may be on the non-conservative side, predicting a shorter recovery time of 
damaged infrastructure and a lower monetary losses than would actually be the 
case. 
• The uncertainty of seismic intensities is not considered in most existing research.  
Seismic intensities can deviate significantly from its mean or median value due to 
its natural uncertainty (aleatory uncertainty).  Thus, neglecting the uncertainty in 
the seismic intensities fails to provide a proper context for decision making 
regarding infrastructure systems. 
• Though the seismic intensities have been modeled as random variables in some 
existing research, the spatial correlation of seismic intensities over an urban area 
has not been considered.  This disregard of the spatial correlation of seismic 
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intensities fails to model the stochastic field describing the seismic intensity 
properly, and may not capture the regional variation on infrastructure damage 
properly.  This yields unexpected errors in the estimated residual serviceability of 
the networked system. 
• The serviceability assessment of infrastructure systems has been addressed by a 
single seismic intensity attenuation equation, a single formula of local soil 
amplification factors and a single fragility curve of facilities comprising an 
infrastructure system.  By neglecting the epistemic uncertainties due to selecting 
specific formulas or factors from many choices, the evaluated serviceability may 
not provide enough information for decision making. 
• Most existing studies have been applied with a specific (scenario) earthquake 
which has low (but unknown) frequency.  Thus, the serviceability of a damaged 
infrastructure system assessed on the basis of this scenario earthquake may not 
reflect the expected seismic hazard to the system.  Such assessments may lead to 
costly design or retrofit strategies that provide excessive resistance or redundancy 
when they are not required.  
In addition to these substantive concerns, some of the previous network analysis 
methodologies reviewed, e.g., serviceability assessment using matrix operations to 
identify cascading failures within a network, may be difficult to implement for practical 
systems.   While such approaches, may determine the cascading failures correctly, the 
total computing time and cost might be a problem if a large and complicated 
infrastructure system were to be assessed.  Computational efficiency is essential for 
practical infrastructure system network evaluation. 
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These research issues are addressed by the serviceability assessment methods 





MODELS OF INFRASTRUCTURE INTERDEPENDENCY 
 
Civil infrastructure systems are highly inter-connected and each system requires 
support from other infrastructure systems to maintain its function.  Recognizing such 
types of infrastructure interdependencies and types of failures is necessary to model 
infrastructure systems and to analyze effects of infrastructure interdependency on the 
reliability and serviceability of a networked system.  In this chapter, the fundamental 
nature of the interrelationships between infrastructure systems is introduced, along with 
conceptual approaches to their analysis.   
3.1 Mechanism of Infrastructure Interaction 
Infrastructure systems are interdependent in various aspects.  Rinaldi et al. (2001) 
classified the interdependency into four categories: physical, geographical, informational 
and logical. 
The physical interdependency is defined as the situation where one infrastructure 
system needs commodities or outputs from other systems to maintain its function.  For 
example, a pumping station may lose its function when an electrical power substation 
which supplies electrical power to the pumping station since electrical power is required 
to maintain the function of a pumping station. 
The geographical interdependency among infrastructure systems is evident.  For 
example, the function of a water pumping station in Shelby County, TN may be strongly 
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impacted by the failure of an electrical power substation in the same county, but little 
affected by the failure of an electrical power substation in California. 
According to Rinaldi et al. (2001), the informational interdependency among 
infrastructure systems is defined where “the state of an infrastructure system depends on 
information transmitted through the information infrastructure.”  For example, systems 
that manage electrical power flow operate through internet systems, telecommunication 
networks or other cyber network systems.  Logical interdependency is defined where “the 
state of one infrastructure system depends on the state of the other via a mechanism that 
is not a physical, cyber, or geographic connection.”  For example, increasing oil prices 
decrease purchasing power since people spend more for fuel.  In this case, the petroleum 
and the financial infrastructures are logically connected.  These latter two types of 
infrastructure interdependency are not considered in this study since the effects of the 
physical and geographical interdependency include the effects of the informational 
interdependency when seismic hazard is considered.  Since serviceability of an 
infrastructure system after a seismic event is considered in this study, the logical 
interdependency is not of interest.   
In order to better understand the vulnerability of interdependent networked systems, 
the nature of failures within these systems are classified into three categories: cascading 
failure, escalating failure and common cause failure (Rinaldi et al., 2001). 
A cascading failure occurs when the failure or the malfunction of one facility in an 
infrastructure system causes the failure or the malfunction of another facility in the 
infrastructure system although the latter facility is not physically damaged.  For example, 
an electrical power substation cannot perform its function when generating plants cannot 
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supply electrical power to the substation.  This type of failure can be analyzed by 
checking the availability of commodities from supply facilities. 
An escalating failure arises when the malfunction or the failure of a facility 
diminishes the function on another facility.  For example, disconnection of 
telecommunication networks or internet systems increases the time required to eliminate 
traffic congestion due to a car accident since the arrival of police officers and rescue 
crews at the site of the accident may be delayed due to lack of information.  This type of 
component failure may be included in the cascading failure when a seismic demand is 
considered. 
A common cause failure occurs when two or more components fail at the same 
time due to an event that impacts both components.  For example, since facilities which 
are located close each other both may be exposed to similar seismic intensities, such 
facilities may be damaged at the same time if their seismic resistances are similar.  
Analyzing this type of failure requires that spatial correlation of seismic intensities be 
modeled accurately. 
3.2 System Reliability Theory 
 Civil infrastructure systems are modeled as consisting of facilities and distributing 
elements.  A water distribution system consists of dams, storage tanks and pumping 
stations as facilities and pipes as distributing element.  An electrical power transmission 
system involves generating plants, substations and transmission towers as facilities and 
transmission lines as distributing elements.   The performance of such systems can be 
assessed using methods of system reliability analysis.   
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 System reliability theory is used in a variety of engineering fields and has a 
central role in risk analysis, quality management, maintenance and operation optimization 
and engineering design.  As a tool for evaluating infrastructure systems, system reliability 
theory can be used to assess potential risks of natural hazards for infrastructure systems, 
to improve redundancy of infrastructure systems efficiently, to create maintenance plans 
at lower cost and higher efficiency, and to design the layout of facilities and distributing 
elements of infrastructure systems.   
 There are several approaches to quantifying the failure modes of an infrastructure 
system.  These include fault tree models, reliability block diagrams and event tree 
analysis. 
 A fault tree model is a logic diagram that displays the interrelationships between a 
potential critical event (accident) in a system and the causes for this event (Rausand and 
Hoyland, 2004).  The fault tree model can deal with both qualitative and quantitative 
analysis.  The primary (or top) failure event of interest is situated at the top of the fault 
tree; below the top event are located, in turn, the immediate causal failure events.  The 
primary failure event and the immediate causal failure events are connected through logic 
gates (AND or OR gates).   The process is continued until the top event is expressed as a 
combination of basic events which are located at the bottom of the fault tree, so the 
structure of the fault tree is deductive in nature.  In a fault tree model, all failure events 
from primary to basic failure events are binary in nature: occurs or does not occur, fails 
or does not fail, etc.   Events with intermediate states cannot be analyzed (U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, 1981; Ang and Tang, 1984; Rausand and Hoyland, 2004).  
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 Figure 3-3 illustrate three simple fault tree models.  In Figure 3-1, the top event is 
the result of three basic events 1-3, linked through an OR-gate.  Thus, the top event 
occurs if any of the basic events occur.  In Figure 3-2, the top event is the result of three 
basic events 1-3, linked through an AND-gate.  Here, the top event occurs only if all 
three basic events occur at the same time.  In Figure 3-3, the top event is the result of 
basic event 1 or a sub-event, while the sub-event requires the occurrence of both events 2 
and 3.   
 Quantitative analysis of a fault tree model requires the identification of minimal 
cut-sets or minimal path-sets after the fault tree is constructed.  A minimal cut-set is 
defined as an essential set of basic events whose occurrence must result in occurrence of 
the top event.  A minimal path-set is defined as an essential set of basic events whose 
non-occurrence results in the non-occurrence of the top event (Rausand and Hoyland, 
2004).  Table 3-1 describes the minimal path-sets and the minimal cut-sets of three events 
shown in Figures 3.1 - 3.3.  In Table 3-1, { }•  represents a set of basic events.  For 
example, the occurrence of any of the basic events 1, 2 or 3 results in the occurrence of 
top event A, thus, each basic event 1, 2 or 3 is a minimal cut-set of event A. On the other 
hand, top event A does not occur when basic events 1, 2 or 3 does not occur at the same 



















Figure 3-3 Fault tree model using OR and AND gates 
 
Table 3-1 Minimal cut-sets and minimal path-sets of three events A, B and C 
Event A Event B Event C
Minimal cut-set {1}{2}{3} {1,2,3} {1}{2,3}
Minimal path-set {1,2,3} {1}{2}{3} {1,2}{1,3}  
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In a reliability block diagram, the function of a system is illustrated as a logical 
combination of functioning components which are not repairable.  Thus, a reliability 
block diagram is the graphical representation of how components are connected in such a 
way as to comprise a system.  The combinations of functioning components in a 
reliability block diagram are classified into series and parallel structures.  A series system 
is defined as a system whose components are linked in a single row.  Thus, a series 
system maintains its function only when all components maintain their function.  A 
parallel system is defined as a system whose components cannot be linked together in a 
row.  Thus, a parallel system maintains its function as long as at least one component 
maintains its function (Rausand and Hoyland, 2004).   
For quantitative analysis of a system described by a reliability block diagram, a 
structure function must be constructed.  A structure function ( )xφ  is a binary function 
assumed to take on values 1 if the system is functioning and 0 if the system is in a failed 
state.  The structure function is a function of a state vector ( x ), whose coefficients ( ix ) 
are binary variables representing the two states of the components that comprise the 
system; 1 if component i is functioning, 0 if component i is in a failed state.  The 
structure function of a series system is expressed as a product of all coefficients in a state 
vector (Eq.3-1).  The structure function of a parallel system is expressed as the maximum 
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The failure probability of a system can be calculated (at least conceptually) when 
failure probabilities of the components of the system can be determined.  When failure 
events of components are statistically independent, the failure probability of a series 
system is computed as Equation 3-3 and the failure probability of a parallel system is 


















         (3-4) 
If the component failures  are not statistically independent, the failure probability 
of a system can be computed from an integral of the joint probability density function 
describing the random variables over the domain defined by the limit state function of a 
system failure (Thoft-Christensen and Baker, 1982; Ang and Tang, 1984; Thoft-
Christensen and Muratsu, 1986; Melchers, 1999).  Monte Carlo simulation may be used 
to perform this integral when the system behavior or limit state are complex or the 
component failure events are not statistically independent (Ang and Tang, 1984; 
Melchers, 1999).    
 Figures 3.4 - 3.6 illustrate three simple and typical reliability block diagrams.  
These diagrams represent the same events illustrated by the fault tree models in Figures 
3.1 - 3.3.  By determining that there is at least one connection between the two ends, the 
system is identified as being functioning.  For example, when any one of the three 
components shown in Figure 3-4 fails, there is no connection between the ends, and the 
system fails.  In Figure 3-5, the system loses its function only when all three components 
fail.  In Figure 3-6, there is no connection between two ends when either component 1 
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fails or components 2 and 3 fail.  The structure functions of these three systems are given 
















Figure 3-6 Reliability block diagram of a system with series and parallel structures 
 
( ) 321 xxxx ⋅⋅=φ         (3-5) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )321 1111 xxxx −⋅−⋅−−=φ       (3-6) 
( ) ( ) ( )321 111 xxxx ⋅−⋅−−=φ       (3-7) 
 An initiating event generally leads to a sequence of other events.  For example, 
when a building fire occurs (an initializing event), fire alarms may warn the building 
residents (one consequential event) or they may fail to operate (the second consequential 
event).   If the fire alarms function, residents may either escape from the building safely 
or wait for firefighters to assist them in evacuation (third events following the preceding 
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second event).  Such event progressions can be modeled by an event tree analysis.  Each 
event in an event tree has two or more outcomes, and each outcome is conditioned on the 
occurrence of a previous event.  Thus, the initiating event is connected inductively with 
the final outcomes through the sequences of events depicted in the event tree.  Since each 
outcome has a probability of occurrence, the probability of each final outcome can be 
calculated by multiplying the conditional probabilities of the sequential events on the 
path from the initiating event to the final outcome.  Event trees also can be used to 
describe the multiplicity of choices involved in decision analysis, in which case the event 
tree model is called a decision tree model.  Both models are used to compute the 
probability of occurrence of final outcomes and their consequences (Ang and Tang, 1984; 
Rausand and Hoyland, 2004). 
 An example of an event tree and its probabilistic analysis is illustrated in Figure 
3-7.  Here, the initiating event occurs with probability 1r .  Once the initiating event occurs, 
the second event occurs.  The outcomes of the second event are True or False.  The 
probability that the second event is True is Tr ,2 , and the probability that the it outputs 
False is Fr ,2 .  If the second event results in False, no other events occur and the final 
outcome 7 is evaluated at the probability of Trr ,21 ⋅ .  If the second event results in True, 
the third event occurs and N outcomes (Choice 1, Choice 2, ···, Choice N) are possible 
with the probabilities of 1,3r , 2,3r  and Nr ,3 , respectively.  By continuing the procedure, the 
probability of each outcome is evaluated.  For example, the probability of Outcome 1 is 
computed as ANTO rrrrr ,1,3,211 L⋅⋅= .  By comparing the probabilities of final outcomes, 
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the most probable outcome can be identified.  Furthermore, if the outcomes are expenses 
or casualties, the consequences can be measured by the weighted average, 
 721 721 OutcomerOutcomerOutcomer OOO ⋅++⋅+⋅ L    (3-8) 
 






































Figure 3-7 An event tree model 
 
3.3 Network Accessibility Assessment 
 Most civil infrastructure systems are designed to be redundant to maintain their 
function after a natural or man-made hazard.  The number of components, topology of the 
network, and system redundancy make the infrastructure system complex to analyze.  
While a simple infrastructure system (or facility within it) can be modeled by a fault tree 
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model or reliability block diagram and can be analyzed as to whether it has or has not 
failed after the occurrence of a hazard (e.g. Figures 3.1 - 3.6), a complicated 
infrastructure system cannot be easily modeled by fault tree models or reliability block 
diagrams.  Furthermore, a highly redundant infrastructure system with high redundancy 
can have many failure modes.    
 As noted previously, a facility within an infrastructure system frequently cannot 
maintain its function without resources or service from other systems (infrastructure 
interdependency).   Furthermore, a facility sometimes cannot function following the 
occurrence of a hazard even though the facility itself is not physically damaged because 
other components of the infrastructure system are unable to deliver service to the facility 
(cascading failure).  The interdependencies and the cascading failure can be identified by 
investigating the accessibility of demand facilities from supply facilities.  In other words, 
supply facilities, such as water storage tanks or electrical power generating plants, 
provide commodities such as water or electrical power, to demand facilities, such as 
water distribution nodes or electrical power substations which need the commodities to 
maintain their function.  
One approach to the accessibility assessment is furnished by classical probability 
theory.   For example, Yan and Shaoping (2003) expressed the accessibility of a facility 
as a union of all path-sets from a supply facility to the facility evaluated.  In this approach, 
all path-sets need to be identified in advance, and the approach must be applied to every 
facility comprising the infrastructure system one-by-one.  In a somewhat different 
approach, Ang et al. (1996) and Pires et al (1996) used an adjacency matrix.  In this 
approach, the accessibility of all possible pairs of facilities composing an infrastructure 
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system can be analyzed at once.  While this approach is conceptually straightforward, 
computing time is a significant barrier when the infrastructure system analyzed has many 
facilities and distributing elements because the size of the adjacency matrix becomes very 
large. 
 When modeling an infrastructure system, the directed path through a network 
between two facilities with a total length that is the minimum is called the shortest path.  
Algorithms that can identify these shortest paths, which is called the shortest path 
algorithm, can overcome the difficulties of the two methods above.   
 Several shortest path algorithms have been proposed in the operations research 
field.  Dijkstra’s algorithm (Dijkstra, 1956) and the Floyd-Warshall algorithm (Floyd, 
1962; Warshall, 1962) both have been widely used are simple to program.  Details of 
Dijkstra’s algorithm can be found in, for instance, Rardin (1997), Kreyszig (1998) or 
Papadimitriou and Steiglitz (1998).  The Floyd-Warshall algorithm has an important 
advantage over the Dijkstra’s algorithm, in that it can find the shortest paths between all 
pairs of nodes simultaneously.  In contrast, Dijkstra’s algorithm only can find them one-
by-one.  Thus, the Floyd-Warshall algorithm is introduced here as the approach to 
evaluate network accessibility. 
In The Floyd-Warshall algorithm (Floyd, 1962; Warshall, 1962), when one 
facility cannot access another facility, the path length is set equal to infinity (in 
computation, a very large number), that is, the commodity is prevented from being 
conveyed between these facilities.  The flow direction of the commodity in the 
distributing element is a key ingredient of accessibility assessment.  The Floyd-Warshall 
algorithm is illustrated as follows: 
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Input: An n-by-n matrix, where a coefficient ci,j represents the 
length of distributing element delivering commodities from 
facility i to facility j. 
Output: An n-by-n matrix, where a coefficients di,j reprensents 
the length of the shortest path from facility i to facility j. 
Begin: for all i except i=j  do di,j=ci,j 
 for i=1,…,n  do di,i=∞ 
 for j=1,…,n  do 
  for i=1,…,n except i=j  do 
   for k=1,…,n except k=j  do 
    di,k=min{ di,k , di,j + dj,k } 
 for all i  do di,i=0 
End 
 
Figure 3-8 Floyd-Warshall algorithm (modified from Papadimitriou and Steiglitz (1998) 
 
 To illustrate the use of the Floyd-Warshall algorithm in finding the shortest paths 
between pairs of facilities, the simple network model shown in Figure 3-9 is analyzed.  
Each arrow represents the flow direction of commodities.  The number shown with each 











Figure 3-9 A sample network model 
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The matrix whose coefficients represent the lengths of the paths directly connecting two 
adjacent nodes are shown as matrix C in Figure 3-10.  In this matrix, a coefficient ci,j 
represents the distance from node i to node j.  Since the distance from node i to node i is 
always 0, the diagonal coefficients are always 0.  Infinity (∞) represents two nodes that 
are not directly connected.  (In the computation, a very large number is used instead of 
∞.)  Since flow directions represented by arrows in Figure 3-9 are considered, the matrix 































Figure 3-10 Matrix representing direct path lengths 
 
Before looping with respect to j, distance matrix C is initialized as Dj=1 by replacing the 
diagonal coefficients 0 with ∞, as shown in Figure 3-11.  The successive stages of the 
matrix D corresponding to j are shown in Figure 3-11. 
 
Dj=1 = Dj=2 =

















































































































Figure 3-11 Successive stages of distance matrix D 
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When j = 2 and i = 1, the coefficients in the first row of Dj=2 in Figure 3-11 are 
determined as follows; 
 
for j=2  do 
 for i=1  do 
  for k=1 
   d1,1 = min{ d1,1 , d1,2 + d2,1 } 
          = min{ ∞ , 3 + ∞} 
          = ∞ 
  for k=2  skipped since k=j 
   d1,2 = 3 
  for k=3 
   d1,3 = min{ d1,3 , d1,2 + d2,3 } 
          = min{ ∞ , 3 + 2} 
                    = 5 
  for k=4 
   d1,4 = min{ d1,4 , d1,2 + d2,4 } 
          = min{ 2 , 3 + ∞} 
          = 2 
 






























Figure 3-13 Matrix representing the shortest path lengths 
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After looping the steps to find the shortest path with respect to j, all diagonal coefficients 
∞ are reset equal to 0. Then, the shortest path matrix D in Figure 3-13 is obtained.  In this 
matrix, a coefficient represents the shortest path length from one node to the other node.  
For example, coefficient d1,3=4 means the shortest path from node 1 to node 3 is 4.  On 
the other hand, d3,1=∞ represents that node 1 is not accessible from node 3.  As shown in 
Figure 3-8, the Floyd-Warshall algorithm required ( )21−⋅ nn  iterations to find the 
shortest path of all pairs of nodes. 
3.4 Summary 
 In this chapter, the mechanisms of infrastructure interdependency are illustrated.  
Then, the fundamental methods of networked systems, which properly model the effects 
of infrastructure interaction and cascading failure, are introduced with simple 
illustrations.  Lastly, the Floyd-Warshall algorithm is introduced as a method for 
identifying the shortest paths through an infrastructure network, and the computational 
approach to evaluate the accessibility between facilities is represented with a simple 
example.   The techniques and algorithms illustrated in this chapter are used to the 





CHARACTERIZING SEISMIC DEMAND ON INFRASTRUCTURE 
SYSTEMS 
 
Earthquakes have regional characteristics: epicenters, magnitudes, seismic wave 
propagation characteristics and ground motions at specific sites.  For structural design of 
new facilities and estimating damage to existing facilities, capturing these regional 
characteristics is important.   
This chapter introduces fundamental characteristics and mathematical models of 
regional earthquake characteristics in the Central and Eastern United States (CEUS), 
including earthquake sources, attenuation relationships, ground motion amplifications 
due to local soil characteristics, and spatial correlation of ground motions.  Two methods 
for specifying seismic hazard are introduced: probabilistic seismic hazard analysis 
(PSHA) and scenario earthquake (SE) based seismic hazard analysis.  The 
characterization of seismic hazard in this Chapter will be used subsequently to compute 
seismic intensities such as peak ground acceleration (PGA) and peak ground velocity 
(PGV) at sites of facilities and distribution elements comprising infrastructure systems 
after properly selected scenario earthquakes. 
4.1 Seismic Hazard 
According to Boore (1987 and 2003), the spectrum of ground motion at a site can 
be evaluated from four ingredients: earthquake source (E), path (P), site (G) and type of 
motion (I) as follows (see Figure 4-1): 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )fIfGfRPfMEfRMY ⋅⋅⋅= ,,,, 00      (4-1) 
where 0M  is the seismic moment which is related to the moment magnitude of the 
earthquake, R  is the distance from the source to the site and f  is the frequency.  The 
shape and the amplitude of the source spectrum ( )fME ,0  are specified from a single 
corner or double corner frequency spectrum and earthquake size.  The path effect 
spectrum ( )fRP ,  is determined from the geometrical spreading of seismic waves and the 
epicentral distance to the site.  The site effect spectrum ( )fG  is determined from the 
local soil condition at the site.  Finally, ( )fI  is used to model the particular local ground 
motion evaluated from the other three spectra (Boore, 1987 and 2003; Fernandez and 







Figure 4-1 Seismic wave path from source to site (modified from Kramer, 1996) 
 
From geological information and historical seismicity, seismic intensities at a site 
are determined using the following three factors: earthquake sources as a function of 
earthquake magnitude, attenuation relationships as a function of earthquake magnitude 
and epicentral distance to the site, and local soil amplification as a function of local soil 
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condition and seismic intensity at the site.  In addition, spatial correlation of seismic 
intensities is an important factor when analyzing response of an infrastructure system 
whose facilities and distribution elements are distributed over a wide area. 
4.1.1 Earthquake Source  
The earthquake source term depends on location of the earthquake epicenter and 
magnitude.  The geographical distribution of epicenters is evaluated from earthquake 
records and fault locations.  The recurrence of an earthquake with a certain magnitude 
level in a source zone is estimated by the Gutenberg-Richter recurrence law or the 
bounded Gutenberg-Richter recurrence law (Gutenberg and Richter, 1944; Kramer, 
1996).   
The Gutenberg-Richter recurrence law models a mean annual frequency of an 










        (4-2)  
where ( ) a⋅= 10lnα  and ( ) b⋅= 10lnβ .  The Gutenberg-Richter recurrence law implies 
that earthquake magnitudes are exponentially distributed when the range of possible 
earthquakes in large area are considered.  The probability density function of magnitude 
M for the Gutenberg-Richter recurrence law is expressed as follows: 
( ) ( )mmf M ⋅−⋅= ββ exp        (4-3)  
The Gutenberg-Richter recurrence law often is bounded to capture the maximum 
event believed possible at a site or the minimum event of engineering significance.  In 
this law, the distribution of magnitudes has a maximum (mmax), which is determined from 
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historical or geological evidence.  According to Frankel et al. (1996 and 2002), the 
maximum magnitude is 7.5 for the CEUS.  For engineering purposes, a lower threshold 
magnitude (m0) is also implemented, which is defined as the magnitude of earthquake 
(typically a value between 4.0 and 5.0) below which significant damage is unlikely to 
occur (McGuire and Arabasz, 1990; Kramer, 1996).  By considering both the lower 
threshold magnitude and the maximum magnitude, the mean annual rate of exceedance of 
an earthquake of magnitude is: 












νλ     (4-4) 
where ( )0exp m⋅−= βαν  and max0 mmm ≤≤ .  The probability density function of 
magnitude for the bounded Gutenberg-Richter recurrence law is expressed as follows: 











      (4-5) 
4.1.2 Ground Motion Attenuation  
 The decay in seismic waves due to the seismic wave path from source to site is 
represented by an attenuation relationship, which is determined from many records of 
measured ground motions from earthquakes occurring in geologically similar zones.  
Attenuation relationships typically describe a mean or median value of a local ground 
motion intensity measure (ground motion or spectral ordinate) as a function of the 
magnitude of an earthquake and the epicentral distance from the epicenter to the site 
evaluated.  The uncertainty associated with these relationships is a major source of 
uncertainty in seismic risk assessment of civil infrastructure facilities.  Several 
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attenuation relationships for estimating ground motions in the CEUS are available, as 
described below.   
 Toro and McGuire (1987) developed attenuation relationships for PGA, PGV and 
spectral velocities based on historical records and a random vibration model proposed by 















069.1717.1ln )1987(&     (4-7) 
where Mw is moment magnitude and R is an epicentral distance.  Atkinson and Boore 
(1990) proposed attenuation relationships for PGA and PGV, and spectral accelerations 
on hard rock which were derived from an empirically based stochastic ground motion 
model (Eq.4-1).  The relationships for PGA and PGV are: 
( ) ( )
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   (4-9) 
Hwang and Huo (1997) also developed attenuation relationships for PGA and spectral 
accelerations based on historical records, random vibration theory and a stochastic 












)1997(    (4-10) 
Toro et al. (1997) proposed the following attenuation relationships for PGA and spectral 
accelerations on rock based on the predictions of a stochastic ground motion model 
(Eq.4-1) and ground motion records: 
































   (4-11) 
Toro (2003) later modified this relationship by including it as one of a weighted average 
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Finally, the attenuations of PGA and spectral accelerations derived by Campbell (2003) 
employed a hybrid empirical method which includes the stochastic ground motion model 
(Eq.4-1).  The attenuation relationship is bounded at epicentral distances of 70km and 
130km considering the effect of the Mohorovicic discontinuity (Kramer, 1996):    
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The six attenuation relationships for PGA and the two attenuation relationships 
for PGV shown above are plotted in Figures 4.2 and 4.3 for Mw=7.7.  Each attenuation 
relationship leads the median values of PGA or PGV at specific epicentral distances.  The 
aleatory uncertainty, which is due to the shortage of knowledge or data and yields the 
deviation from the attenuation relationship, must be included, as described subsequently.  
Furthermore, the difference among the attenuation relationships leads an epistemic 
uncertainty, which is due to the differences in the modeling approaches on which the 
attenuation relationships are based.  This epistemic uncertainty must also be evaluated 
properly, which is discussed in the following chapters. 
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Toro & McGuire (1987)









Figure 4-2 Comparison of attenuation relationships for PGA when Mw = 7.7 
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Atkinson & Boore (1995)










Figure 4-3 Comparison of attenuation relationships for PGV when Mw = 7.7 
 
4.1.3 Local Soil Amplification 
Ground motions are amplified or damped as a result of local soil conditions at a 
site.    This effect is captured from knowledge of the profile of local soil layers, the wave 
velocity in each layer of local soil, the plasticity index (PI) of each soil layer, the over-
consolidation ratio (OCR) of each soil layer and ground water level at the local site 
(Hwang et al, 1997; Dobry et al, 2000).  The local amplification effects are represented 
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numerically by soil amplification factors with respect to the seismic intensity of interest, 
such as peak ground acceleration, peak ground acceleration, spectral acceleration or 
spectral velocity. 
The local soil amplification factors proposed in the 2003 NEHRP Provisions 
(FEMA, 2004) are widely used to estimate the amplification effects of ground motions 
due to local soil conditions.  These factors are classified in six categories (A: hard rock, 
B: rock, C: dense soil, D: stiff soil, E: soft clay and F: soil requiring site-specific 
evaluation) mainly by shear wave velocity and standard penetration resistance.  The local 
soil amplification factors proposed in the 2003 NEHRP Provisions are determined mostly 
from the ground motion data in California (Hwang et al., 1997), and the characteristics of 
ground motions in the CEUS may not be similar to those in the Western United States 
(WUS) (Nuttli, 1981 and 1982).  Local soil amplification factors for CEUS regions also 
have been proposed (e.g., Hwang et al., 1997), but fewer supporting research studies are 
available.   
The local soil amplification factors for PGA and PGV proposed by the 2003 
NEHRP Provisions (FEMA, 2004) are shown in Tables 4-1 and 4-2, respectively.    The 
local soil amplification factors from site category B (rock) to D (stiff soil) for PGA and 
PGV proposed by the 2003 NEHRP Provisions (FEMA, 2004) and Hwang et al (1997) 
are compared in Figures 4-4 and 4-5. 
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Table 4-1 Short period amplification factor, FA 
Site Class PGA≤0.25 g PGA=0.5 g PGA=0.75 g PGA=1.00 g PGA≥1.25 g
A 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
B 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
C 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.0
D 1.6 1.4 1.2 1.1 1.0
E 2.5 1.7 1.2 0.9 0.9  
 
Table 4-2 1.0-second period amplification factor, FV 
Site Class S1≤0.1 g S1=0.2 g S1=0.3 g S1=0.4 g S1≥0.5 g
A 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
B 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
C 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.3
D 2.4 2.0 1.8 1.6 1.5

























Figure 4-4 Comparison of amplification factors from site category B to D for PGA 
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Figure 4-5 Comparison of amplification factors from site category B to D for PGV 
 
According to the 2003 NEHRP Provisions (FEMA, 2004), the local soil 
amplification factor for PGA is directly determined from Table 4-1 or from Figure 4-4.  
On the other hand, to determine the local soil amplification factor for PGV, spectral 
acceleration at 1.0 second (Sa(T=1.0sec)) is used.  The following transformation equation 












= πinPGV      (4-14) 
By multiplying the attenuated seismic intensities by the local soil amplification factors, 
the, seismic intensities at the surface soil can be computed as follows: 
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Abasesurface FPGAPGA ⋅=        (4-15) 
Vbasesurface FPGVPGV ⋅=        (4-16) 
These ground motion intensities will be used subsequently in evaluating the intensities of 
ground motion impacting the water distribution system and the electrical power 
transmission system.  
4.1.4 Correlation of Seismic Intensities 
 Since an infrastructure system is composed of many facilities and distributing 
elements which are distributed over a region, numerous seismic intensities scattered over 
that same region must be used for its serviceability assessment.  When a single scenario 
earthquake is used for the serviceability assessment, the seismic intensities at sites of 
components are stochastically dependent to some degree due to the epicentral distances, 
local soil conditions and the proximity of components.  In common engineering 
applications, such local variations in intensity are captured by the regional variation of 
first-order statistics of attenuation (e.g. mean or median).  The covariance of seismic 
intensity (a second-order statistical property) is not considered in general. 
The variance in seismic intensity is modeled by the standard error associated with 
the attenuation relationship.  The stochastic dependence of the seismic intensities at 
different sites is modeled by the spatial correlation of seismic intensities (Wesson and 
Perkins, 2001; Shimomura and Takada, 2004; Takada and Shimomura, 2003 and 2004; 
Wang and Takada, 2005).  Unlike the regional variation captured by the first-order 
statistics (mean or median) of attenuation, the covariance of seismic intensity models the 
statistical association (correlation) between intensities at two sites.  This covariance 
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function clearly depends on the geographical distances between sites of components, and 
may depend on the magnitude and epicentral distances as well.   
In the studies by Shimomura and Takada (2004), Takada and Shimomura (2003 
and 2004) and Wang and Takada (2005), the spatial correlations of peak ground 
accelerations and peak ground velocities are described by exponential functions with 



























L lnlnε        (4-18)  
where ( )•LLR  is the auto-correlation function of L , •  defines the distance between two 
sites, is  is the geographical coordinate of a component i , b  is a correlation distance 
which represents the strength of spatial correlation and whose unit is the same as • , Xiε  
is the residual of seismic intensity at a site of a component i , iX  is the seismic intensity 
at the site of a component i , and iX  is the median seismic intensity at the site of a 
component i  which is computed from an attenuation relationship.  The studies by 
Shimomura and Takada (2004), Takada and Shimomura (2003 and 2004) and Wang and 
Takada (2005) using the ground motion records of six earthquakes that have occurred in 
Japan and Taiwan revealed that correlation distances b typically are about 20 to 30 km 
for PGA and about 20 to 40 km for PGV.  
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4.2 Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis 
 For the seismic hazard analysis, earthquake sources with the potential to affect the 
sites, seismic wave path from the sources to the sites and local soil conditions of the sites 
need to be evaluated.  In general, the site may be affected by a number of seismic sources 
and the magnitudes of earthquakes from each seismic source are not deterministic.  A 
probabilistic seismic hazard analysis (PSHA) determines the aggregated effect of the 
range of possible earthquakes in seismic source zones that are in proximity to a site, 
weighted by the probability of occurrence of each earthquake (McGuire, 1995; Kramer, 
1996).  The annual frequency of earthquakes whose seismic intensities at a site exceed a 
certain value is evaluated as follows: 













νλ     (4-19) 
where yλ  is the annual frequency rate of earthquakes, SN  is the number of earthquake 
sources, ( )0exp miii ⋅−= βαν  at earthquake source i evaluated from the Gutenberg-
Richter’s law (Eq.4-2), [ ]rmyYP ,|∗>  is the probability that seismic intensity generated 
from an earthquake whose magnitude is m and epicentral distance is r exceeds ∗y  which 
is the threshold seismic intensity, ( )mf
iM
 is the probabilistic density function of 
magnitude of earthquake occurring at source i, and ( )rf
iR
 is the probabilistic density 
function of epicentral distance of earthquake occurring at source i.  Under the assumption 
that earthquake occurrence can be modeled as a Poisson process, the PSHA results in the 
probability that seismic intensities at a site exceed a threshold seismic intensity during  a 
certain interval of time (McGuire, 1995; Kramer, 1996) as follows: 
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[ ] ( )TyYP
yT
⋅−−=> ∗∗ λexp1       (4-20) 
where T is  time. 
Probabilistic seismic hazard maps that display contours of seismic intensities 
corresponding to peak ground acceleration, peak ground velocity or spectral parameters 
at specific return periods are prepared by the United States Geological Survey (2002b).  
A PSHA is particularly suited for designing individual facilities since the intensities can 
be represented at a probabilistically stipulated level of the seismic hazard in codes and 
other regulatory documents (e.g., 2% probability of exceedance in 50 years) (FEMA, 
2004; ASCE, 2005).  The seismic hazard maps are created under the assumptions that 
earthquake occurrence is a Poisson process, implying that earthquake occurrence is time-
homogeneous (Frankel et al., 1996).   The seismic hazard map for the CEUS, which 
includes Shelby County, TN, reflects both the New Madrid seismic zone (NMSZ) and a 
“background” source zone to characterize the uncertainty in source location (Frankel et 
al, 1996 and 2002). 
 Since the spatial correlation of seismic intensities shown in the hazard map is lost 
in the aggregation process of creating the map, the application of the mapped uniform 
hazard intensities to serviceability assessment of facilities and distribution elements that 
are spatially distributed over a region and are functionally dependent on each other is 
questionable.  This issue is discussed in further detail in Chapter 5. 
 A seismic source zone is identified from the historical record of earthquakes.  The 
a-values and the b-values of the Gutenberg-Richter law for a particular source are 
determined, in general, from the historical records.  For the creation of a seismic hazard 
map of the CEUS, the a-values of the background source zones are estimated by the 
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earthquake records for a grid with spacing of 0.2 degree in latitude and longitude.  
However, the b-value of the background source zones is assumed to be 0.95, which is 
assumed to be constant for most of the CEUS, including Shelby County, TN (Frankel et 
al, 1996 and 2002).  The epicentral distances are determined as the distance between the 
grid and the site. 
The NMSZ is a major earthquake source zone centered in Southeast Missouri and 
represents a major seismic hazard for several population centers in the Central and 
Eastern United States (CEUS). Very large earthquakes have occurred historically in this 
zone, such as the 1811-1812 sequence, and likely will occur in the future.  Recent studies 
of seismicity in the New Madrid region suggest that earthquakes of such magnitudes have 
a return period of approximately 500 years.  The characteristic attenuation of strong 
ground motion in the Central and Eastern United States is noticeably different from that 
in the Western United States.  According to Nuttli (1982), the 0.25g peak horizontal 
acceleration contours for the New Madrid earthquake (mb = 7.2) enclose an area that is 
about 11 times larger than the comparable area for a southern California earthquake of 
approximately the same magnitude (ML = 7.2), and the area enclosed by the 20 cm/sec 
peak horizontal ground velocity contour was 8.4 times larger.  However, the geological 
and seismological features about the NMSZ are not well researched.  Thus, three 
fictitious faults are used to characterize the uncertainty in epicentral location of 
earthquakes in the NMSZ whose magnitudes (Mw) are greater than or equal to 3.0 (Fig.4-
6) (Frankel et al., 2002).   
The earthquakes from these fictitious faults are referred as characteristic 
earthquakes (Frankel, 1996 and 2002), and their mean recurrence times are assumed to be 
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500 years.  The magnitudes of these characteristic earthquakes and each frequency ratio 
are Mw=7.3 (the frequency ratio is 15%), Mw=7.5 (20%), Mw=7.7 (15%) and Mw=8.0 
(15%) (Cramer, 2001; Frankel et al., 2002). 
 
 
Figure 4-6 Three fictitious faults (red) used to model the New Madrid seismic zone; circles are 
earthquakes with Mw≥3.0 since 1976 (Frankel et al, 2002) 
 
4.3 Scenario Earthquake Analysis 
Probabilistic seismic hazard analysis (PSHA) provides estimates of the mean 
annual rate of occurrence (or annual probability) that ground motions exceed a specific 
intensity (McGuire and Arabasz, 1990).  Because a PSHA can be used to determine point 
or interval estimates of risk based on all possible earthquakes, this method has become a 
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common seismic risk assessment tool and provides the most informative estimate of 
earthquake risk at a particular facility site.  On the other hand, the results from a PSHA 
are sometimes difficult for non-specialist decision makers, such as public officials and 
city planners, to interpret because the significant earthquake threats at the low 
probabilities of interest in safety analysis of civil infrastructure (on the order of 2% in 50 
years, or 0.0004/yr) represent an aggregation of earthquakes events rather than one 
specific earthquake.  This aggregated event fails to model the spatial variability of 
damaging intensities across a region due to any particular severe earthquake (Eguchi, 
1991b; Ishikawa and Kameda, 1994; Chang, et al., 2000; Adachi and Ellingwood, 
2007a), and thus may not be appropriate for assessing risk to a distributed infrastructure 
system.    
A risk assessment based on a scenario earthquake avoids these difficulties, but the 
estimated risk is conditioned on the occurrence of the scenario event.  Appropriate 
scenario events can be determined by a process known as de-aggregation (Bazzurro and 
Cornell, 1999), which identifies the dominant seismic events contributing to an 
earthquake hazard of 2% in 50 years, the current basis for building design in the United 
States (FEMA, 2004; ASCE, 2005), or some other hazard measure for the region being 
evaluated. 
4.3.1 Characteristic Earthquake 
Characteristic earthquakes, as well as large historical earthquakes, are often used 
as scenario earthquakes to assess the damage to facilities.  In contrast to a PSHA, SE-
based seismic hazard analysis is aimed at investigating the impact of a specific 
earthquake (usually stipulated in terms of magnitude and epicenter) on a facility or group 
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of facilities.  Such a specification of seismic hazard is useful as a communication tool.   
Furthermore, McGuire (2001) observed that the SE-based seismic hazard analysis is 
useful for high seismic regions (e.g. California or Japan) since “a deterministic scenario 
for this event will allow details to be examined such as ground motion effects caused by 
rupture propagation.”  McGuire also noted that, “in moderate and low seismic regions, 
extreme deterministic scenarios will have probabilities of occurrence that are too low to 
be useful for most decision purposes.”   
4.3.2 Deaggregation Analysis 
In a SE-based hazard analysis, one specific earthquake is selected from an 
examination of the seismicity surrounding the site or from a de-aggregation analysis of 
potential earthquakes.   The de-aggregation charts provided by the USGS can be used for 
selecting this scenario earthquake (USGS, 2002a).   Most decision-making regarding 
public or private investment in seismic risk mitigation focuses on low-probability/high-
consequence events.  In that case, the earthquake contributing most to the seismic hazard 
at a stipulated low probability level (e.g., 2% in 50 years) often is selected.   
Occasionally, an earthquake is simply selected from recordings of severe ground motion 
(e.g., El Centro, 1940; San Fernando, 1971; Northridge, 1994).  Although the scenario 
earthquake approach is very useful for investigating the damage to an infrastructure 
system when a specific earthquake occurs, it conveys no quantitative information on the 
probability of occurrence of the scenario event considered.  Thus, the system reliability 
analysis is conditional in nature. 
The results of de-aggregation analyses of six return periods (4975 years, 2475 
years, 975 years, 475 years, 224 years and 108 years of return period) at the city of 
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Memphis, TN obtained by On-line Interactive De-aggregations (USGS, 2002a) are shown 
in Figures 4-7 to  4-12. 
 
Figure 4-7 Deaggregation results for 4975-year return period (1% probability of exceedance in 50 
years) (evaluated from USGS, 2002a) 
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Figure 4-8 Deaggregation results for 2475-year return period (2% probability of exceedance in 50 




Figure 4-9 Deaggregation results for 975-year return period (5% probability of exceedance in 50 




Figure 4-10 Deaggregation results for 475-year return period (10% probability of exceedance in 50 




Figure 4-11 Deaggregation results for 224-year return period (20% probability of exceedance in 50 




Figure 4-12 Deaggregation results for 108-year return period (50% probability of exceedance in 75 
years) (evaluated from USGS, 2002a) 
 
From the de-aggregation at Memphis, TN shown in Figures 4-7 to 4-12, the maximum 
probable earthquake (MPE) for each return period [one defined as “the largest predicted 
earthquake that a fault is capable of generating within a specified time period” (Day, 
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2002)] and the mean earthquake [one with mean magnitude and mean epicentral distance 
(Bazzurro and Cornell, 1999)] are determined, as summarized in Table 4-3.  These de-
aggregated earthquakes will be used in Chapters 6 and 7 to assess seismic damage to 
infrastructure networks. 
 
Table 4-3 MPE and the mean earthquake for each return period 
4975 7.7 33 7.3 35
2475 7.7 33 7.3 38
975 7.7 33 7.2 43
475 7.7 61 7.0 49
224 7.7 61 6.5 62

















In this chapter, basic approaches to modeling seismic source zones, attenuation 
relationships of PGA and PGV and amplification of seismic intensities due to local soil 
conditions were introduced, and differences between probabilistic seismic hazard 
assessment and scenario-based assessment were summarized.   De-aggregation analysis 
was presented for selecting proper scenario earthquakes.  The information summarized in 
this chapter will be used in Chapters 6 and 7 for the determination of seismic intensities 




APPLICABILITY OF PSHA TO A NETWORKED SYSTEM 
 
Probabilistic seismic hazard analysis (PSHA) often provides the basis for 
designing a facility since it quantifies the seismic intensity in terms of its probability of 
occurrence during a specific period, taking into account the spectrum of earthquakes 
likely to contribute to the hazard at that site.   A properly conducted PHSA integrates 
uncertainties of earthquake magnitude, epicentral location, wave propagation expressed 
by attenuation relationships, and wave amplification due to local soil condition in 
creating the hazard map, but the effect of interrelations between these factors is lost 
through the aggregation process.  Thus, the applicability of a PSHA to assessing 
performance of an infrastructure system whose facilities and distribution elements are 
spatially distributed and are functionally connected (or related) to each other is 
questionable (Eguchi, 1991b; Chang, 2000). 
Figure 5-1 illustrates why aspects of system functionality that depend on the 
spatial distribution of seismic intensity are not modeled correctly with the PSH-based 
approach.   The upper half of Figure 5-1 shows a simple networked system with two 
facilities (C1 and C2) located between two seismic sources (E1 and E2).  It is assumed that 
C2 requires a commodity (e.g., electrical power, water) from C1 to maintain its function.  
The lower half of the figure shows the resistances of the two facilities (R of C1 and R of 
C2) and the attenuation of seismic intensities with increasing distance generated by the 
two seismic sources (SI of E1 and SI of E2).  Suppose, for simplicity, that the seismic 
intensity represented by curve “PSH” is computed under the assumption that the two 
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seismic zones cause earthquakes with equal frequency.  If the average functionality ratio 
of two facilities in the networked system is evaluated on the basis of the PSH-based 
approach, the average functionality ratio is 0% since resistances of both facilities fall 
below the PSH curve.  On the other hand, when the functionalities of the two facilities are 
evaluated for each earthquake separately, the average functionality ratio is 25%; the 
earthquake from E1 damages C1, causing C2 to lose its function due to cascading failure 
(implying 0% average functionality ratio), while the earthquake from E2 damages C2 but 
does not damage C1 (implying 50% average functionality ratio).  Figure 5-1 shows 
clearly that the spatial distribution of seismic intensities in the vicinity of a site cannot be 
modeled accurately using the PSH-based approach, since no single earthquake can 




















Figure 5-1 Networked system with two seismic zones 
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There are few studies discussing the applicability of seismic intensities from a 
seismic hazard map computed by PSHA to serviceability assessment of an infrastructure 
system.  Chang et al. (2000) assessed the expected monetary loss to an infrastructure 
system in which a small number of earthquakes was selected from all possible 
earthquakes affecting the system.  When these scenario earthquakes are selected “in order 
to represent different levels of system performance or system damage state” (Chang et 
al., 2000), they should be selected so that the expected monetary loss due to the selected 
scenario earthquakes is close to the expected monetary loss due to all possible 
earthquakes.  This methodology works efficiently if the number of selected scenario 
earthquakes is close to the number of all possible earthquakes in a region.  However, 
there is less advantage of this methodology when civil infrastructure systems in the 
regions with moderate seismicity are evaluated since the number of possible earthquakes 
is very large.  Furthermore, no clear reason why PSHA is not applicable to assess the 
serviceability of an infrastructure system was shown in their study. 
In Chapter 5, the functionality of a facility within a simple networked system is 
defined, and its dependence on the functionality of other facilities in the networked 
system is considered.  Then, functionality of facilities in simple networked systems 
evaluated using probabilistic seismic hazard analysis and scenario earthquake-based 
analysis is presented.   Evaluation of a simple system illustrates some of the difficulties in 
performing seismic risk analysis of a distributed network based on PSHA and SE-based 
seismic hazards that would not be as apparent were a realistic network to be evaluated.  
With these issues identified, the assessment of water and electrical networks in Shelby 
County, TN will be considered in Chapters 6 and 7. 
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5.1 Functionality of a Facility in a Networked System 
A networked infrastructure system is composed of facilities and connecting 




Figure 5-2 Model of a networked system 
 
The circles represent facilities and the arrows represent connecting elements and the 
directions in which the utility product or commodity (e.g., power, water, or natural gas) 
flows.  Figure 5-2 illustrates a case where the function of facility 0  is affected by the 
functionalities of the other facilities in the network (cascading failures).  When cascading 
failures are modeled by a reliability block diagram (Rausand and Hoyland, 2004), the 
function of the facility is expressed as the series system in Figure 5-3.   The left square 
indexed NW represents all facilities of the networked system except facility 0 , while the 
right square indexed 0 represents the target facility.  Thus, the survivor function, which 
represents the functionality ratio of the target facility, is expressed by the following 
equation when the failures of the facilities are statistically independent events: 
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000     (5-1)  
where 0Rs  represents the functionality ratio of the target facility; if 00 =Rs ,  the target 
facility is non-functioning, while if 10 =Rs  it is fully functioning
1.   Event 0S  represents 
the event that the facility 0 is functional, while NWS  represents the event that the 
networked system, not including the target facility, is functional.  0Pf  represents the 
probability of failure of facility 0, NWPf  represents the overall probability of failure of 
the networked system excluding the facility 0, 0x  is the seismic intensity at the site of the 
facility 0, and NWx  is the vector of seismic intensities for facilities in the networked 
system excluding the facility 0.  These seismic intensities differ for different components 
in the network, especially for those that are distant from one another.  The relation 
between the survivor function and fragilities is illustrated in Figure 5-4, in which 
the NWPf - x  surface represents a system fragility curve involving all facilities of the 
networked system except the facility 0, the 0Pf - x  surface represents the fragility curve 
of the facility 0, and the NWPf - 0Pf - 0Rs  space illustrates the relationship among them 
(Eq.5-1).   Figure 5-4 illustrates the dependence of the functionality ratio of a target 
facility on the two component fragilities and corresponding seismic intensities.  Thus, the 
system structure and fragility curves both are required to evaluate the functionality ratio 
of the facilities and the networked system since the system fragility ( ( )NWNW xPf ) is 
dependent on the structure of the system even though the facility fragilities ( ( )00 xPf ) are 
independent of the structure of the network. 
                                                 
1 We assume here in presenting the basic concepts that each facility can be in one of two states: fully 

















Figure 5-4 Evaluation of facility functionality ratio 
 
 The functionality of a facility within a networked system may be highly 
dependent on the functionality of other facilities in the networked system.  In the 
following sections, the functionality of a facility in a simple networked system evaluated 
on the basis of a PSHA is compared with the functionality based on a single scenario 
earthquake.  This simple illustration will highlight the drawbacks of relying on a uniform 
probability hazard map for assessing performance of a distributed networked system. 
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5.2 Models of Simple Networked Systems 
In order to assess the effect of the structure of the networked system represented 
by block NW on the functionality ratio of facility 0 (see Figure 5-3), systems which have 
purely series (Figure 5-5) and purely parallel structures (Figure 5-6) are modeled and the 
functionality ratio of a facility in the network is evaluated.  The networked systems in 
these figures contain facilities that are interconnected by distribution elements.  The 
facility identified by a square represents a supply facility, which generates the commodity 
distributed in the networked system, such as electrical power or water.  The facility 
identified by a circle is a demand facility, which is a relay point that conveys the 
commodity from the supply facility to other demand facilities, such as a substation in a 
power distribution system or a pumping station in a water distribution system, and to 
customers.  Cascading failures of demand facilities occur when they cannot receive the 
commodity from any supply facility either directly or indirectly as a result of damage to 
upstream components.   
5.2.1 Network Analysis 
To illustrate the network analysis in a simple way, Figure 5-5 illustrates a simple 
series network system, in which the functionality ratios of three facilities 1 to 3 are to be 
analyzed.  Facility 3 is most strongly dependent on the series structure since its 
functionality ratio is determined by not only the fragility of facility 3 but also the 
fragilities of facilities 0 to 2.  On the other hand, facility 1 is most weakly dependent on 
the series structure since its functionality ratio is determined only by the fragilities of 
facilities 0 and 1.  The reliability block diagrams describing the functions of facilities 1 to 
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3 are shown in Figure 5-7 (a) to (c), respectively.  The survivor functions for facilities 1 
to 3, when the facility failures are statistically independent, are: 
( ) [ ]
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Figure 5-6 illustrates a parallel network system, in which the functionality ratio of 
facility 0 in the networked system (a) and facility 0 in the networked system (b) are to be 
evaluated.  The facility 0 in system (b) sustains the strongest effect of the parallel 
structure since its functionality ratio depends on the fragilities of all three facilities 1 to 3.  
On the other hand, facility 0 in system (a) is most weakly dependent on the parallel 
system structure since its functionality ratio is determined by the fragilities of only 
facilities 1 and 2.  The reliability block diagrams in Figure 5-8 (a) and (b) illustrate the 
function of facility 0 in systems (a) and (b).  Assuming that the facility failures are 
statistically independent events, the survivor functions of facility 0 in systems (a) and (b) 
are:  
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Figure 5-8 The reliability block diagram of the parallel system 
 75 
5.2.2 Network System Fragilities 
The system fragility curves based on these survivor functions are shown in Figure 
5-9 under the assumption that all facilities in the network are subjected to the same 
seismic intensities and the fragility of each facility is described by the log-normal 
































     (5-7) 
where λ  is the mean of ln(X), computed by ))(ln( Xmedian , and ζ  is the standard 
deviation of )ln(X .   In this simple illustration, all fragilities are defined by λ = ln(0.4g) 
and ζ = 0.4; these values are typical for fragilities in networked systems (FEMA, 2003). 
 















Figure 5-9 System fragility curves (all components subjected to same PGA) 
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5.2.3 Seismic Intensities 
 Since the PGA at a site used in the PSHA is determined from seismic intensities 
generated by all postulated earthquakes proximate to the site, that PGA is dependent on 
the locations of the seismic source zones.  To provide a simple illustration of the effect of 
earthquake epicentral locations and magnitudes on the estimated risk to the networked 
system, the following assumptions are made: 
1. Earthquakes from two seismic source zones may impact the networked system. 
2. Two pairs of seismic source zones are considered.  In the first example, the two 
seismic source zones generate earthquakes with Mw 8.0 and 6.0.  In the second 
example, both seismic source zones generate earthquakes with Mw 8.0.  Each zone 
is assumed to contribute 50% of the earthquake hazard. 
3. Epicentral distances of both source zones, measured from the location of the 
epicenter to the geographic center of the networked system, are arbitrarily set as 
30, 40, 50, 60 and 70 km.  
4. The azimuth of each epicenter with respect to the target system is defined by an 
angleθ , which is a uniformly distributed random number in [ )oo 360,0 . 
Figure 5-10 depicts the relation of the location of epicenters and the networked system.  
The diamond at the center of the figure represents the networked system, with the edges 
representing the connecting elements and the corners representing the facilities.  Each 




















Figure 5-10 Two selected epicenters and the networked system 
 
 In order to determine seismic intensities at each facility, the attenuation equation 
defined in Eq.4-12 (Toro et al., 1997) is used.  Figure 5-11 shows the relation between 
median PGA and the distance from the epicenter to the site evaluated.  The logarithmic 
standard deviation of the PGA associated with Equation 4-12 is 0.6 (e.g., Toro et al., 
1997).   
 


















Figure 5-11 Attenuation relations for Mw=8 and Mw =6 
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 Using the simplified scenario earthquake model defined in this section, 
functionality ratios of facilities are evaluated by both PSHA and the scenario earthquake 
based approach in the following section.  The results of this evaluation illustrate the 
problems associated with using a PSHA as the basis for functionality assessment of 
facilities within a networked system. 
5.2.4 Functionality of a Facility by PSHA and Scenario Earthquake-based 
Approaches 
 Evaluations of the functionality ratio of a facility in a networked system using 
PSH-based and SE-based approaches utilize the simple models of networked systems and 
seismic zones summarized previously.    
The PSH-based approach (summarized in Figure 5-12 (a)) consists of the following 
steps: 
1. Seismic intensities at the sites of all facilities within the network are computed for 
two earthquakes which are defined in section 5.3.   
2. A weighted average of seismic intensities at each site is computed by weighting 
the attenuated intensities by the relative frequencies of the contributing 
earthquakes identified in step 1.  
3. The functionality ratio of each facility in the networked system is evaluated using 
these average seismic intensities and the corresponding survivor function (Eqs. 5-
2 to 5-6). 
In the SE-based approach (summarized in Figure 5-12 (b)), the functionality ratios of the 
facilities in a networked system are evaluated for each scenario earthquake, and the 
resulting facility functionalities are weighted by the probability of occurrence of each 
 79 
earthquake to arrive at an overall estimate of the facility functionality.  If it were possible 
to take the probability of occurrence of all possible earthquakes into account, then the 
functionality ratio of a facility evaluated by the SE-based approach would, in fact, be the 
“exact” functionality ratio of a facility in the networked infrastructure system. 
The SE-based approach consists of the following steps: 
1. Seismic intensities at the sites of facilities are computed for all possible 
earthquakes, as in step 1 of the PSH-based approach. 
2. The functionality ratio of each facility in the networked system is evaluated using 
these seismic intensities and a corresponding survivor function. 
3. The weighted average functionality ratio of each facility in the networked system 
is evaluated, taking into account the relative frequency of the corresponding 
scenario earthquakes.   
As noted previously, the PSH-based approach is relatively straightforward, since the 
USGS seismic hazard map (USGS, 2002b) already reflects the weighted averages of 
seismic intensities in the vicinity of a site. 
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Average functionality ratio for each facility
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Figure 5-12 Assessment of functionality ratio of a facility in a networked system based on (a) PSHA 
and (b) Scenario Earthquake Models 
 
5.3 Estimated functionalities for regional earthquake risks based on PSHA and SE 
 Following the process illustrated in Figure 5-12 (a) and (b), the functionality 
ratios of the facilities in the networked systems illustrated in Figure 5-5 and 5-6 are 
evaluated.  From Equations 5-2 to 5-6, the functionality ratios are calculated by applying 
PGAs from scenario earthquakes or PGAs weighted by contribution ratios.  Figure 5-13 
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to 5-16 display the average functionality ratios corresponding to the facilities within 
networked systems characterized by series and parallel structures. 
 
Facility 1 in figure 5 Facility 2 in figure 5 Facility 3 in figure 5  
Figure 5-13 Functionality of a facility within a series system: Mw (8.0, 6.0)  
(Mesh surface: PSH-based approach; Solid surface: SE-based approach) 
 
Facility 1 in figure 5 Facility 2 in figure 5 Facility 3 in figure 5  
Figure 5-14 Functionality of a facility within a series system: Mw (8.0, 8.0)  
(Mesh surface: PSH-based approach; Solid surface: SE-based approach) 
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 System (a) in figure 6 System (b) in figure 6  
Figure 5-15 Functionality of a facility within a parallel system: Mw (8.0, 6.0)  
(Mesh surface: PSH-based approach; Solid surface: SE-based approach) 
 
System (a) in figure 6 System (b) in figure 6  
Figure 5-16 Functionality of a facility within a parallel system: Mw (8.0, 8.0)  
(Mesh surface: PSH-based approach; Solid surface: SE-based approach) 
 
 Two trends are evident in Figure 5-13 to 5-16.  First, when Mw (8.0, 6.0), as 
shown in Figure 5-13 and 5-15, the functionality ratio of a facility is depends more on the 
distance of the Mw=8.0 earthquake than on the distance of the smaller Mw=6.0 
earthquake; in other words, the larger PGA dominates the functionality ratio of a facility 
in the networked systems with both series and parallel structures.  This can be explained 
by comparing the attenuations of earthquakes with Mw=6.0 and Mw=8.0 in Figure 5-11.  
The PGA from the attenuation of the Mw=8.0 earthquake changes drastically at shorter 
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epicentral distances. This leads to a wider range of functionality ratios for a facility.  On 
the other hand, the PGA from the attenuation of the Mw=6.0 earthquake varies less than 
for the Mw=8.0 earthquake.  Thus, the functionality ratio of a facility due to the Mw=6.0 
earthquake has a narrower range.     
Second, the functionality ratios of each facility evaluated by the PSH-based 
approach and the SE-based approach are quite different.  For example Figure 5-13, 5-14 
and 5-16 show that when the distances of the Mw=8.0 earthquake(s) are larger, the 
functionality ratios of the three facilities evaluated by the SE-based approach are lower 
than those by the PSH-based approach.  Conversely, for smaller epicentral distances of 
the Mw=8.0 earthquake(s), the functionality ratios of the three facilities evaluated by the 
SE-based approach is higher than those by the PSH-based approach.  In Figure 5-15, the 
functionality ratios of facilities evaluated by the SE-based approach are always less than 
that from the PSH-based approach.   
The second trend can be explained by the relation between the fragility curves and 
the survivor function shown in Figure 5-4. For simplicity, the 3D model in Figure 5-4 is 
idealized to the 2D models in Figures 5-17 (a) and (b), where the left half surface 
(Seismic intensity-Failure probability surface) shows a system fragility curve, and the 
right half surface (Failure probability-Functionality ratio surface) shows a survivor 
function.   
Figure 5-17 (a) illustrates the case when two PGAs generated from two seismic 
zones are relatively small but are different in value, such as seismic 
intensities ( )kmRME W 50,0.61 == , ( )kmRME W 50,0.82 ==  in Figure 5-13 and 5-15.  
Following the SE-based approach illustrated in Figure 5-12 (b), failure probabilities 1EPf  
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and 2EPf  are computed from seismic intensities 1E  and 2E  respectively, and 
functionality ratios 1ERs  and 2ERs  are calculated.  By weighting the functionality ratios 
1ERs  and 2ERs  with the contribution ratio (50% for each scenario event), the expected 
functionality ratio 21, −SERs  is evaluated.  In contrast, following the PSH-based approach 
illustrated in Figure 5-12 (b), seismic intensity 21−PSHA  is used to evaluate failure 
probability 21, −PSHAPf  and functionality ratio 21, −PSHARs  is computed.  By comparing 
21, −SERs  and 21, −PSHARs , it is concluded that the PSH-based approach results in a larger 
functionality ratio than the SE-based approach when the two PGAs are relatively small 
and have difference. 
Figure 5-17 (b) illustrates the case when two PGAs generated from two seismic 
zones respectively are relatively large and are different in value, such as seismic 
intensities ( )kmRME W 40,0.81 == , ( )kmRME W 30,0.82 ==  in Figure 5-14 and 5-16.  
In this case, the functionality ratio based on PSH-based approach 21, −PSHARs  is smaller 
than the expected functionality ratio based on SE-based approach 21, −SERs .  Other results 





















































































(b)Two seismic intensities are relatively large. 




 The functionality ratios of facilities within a simple distributed civil infrastructure 
network were evaluated in this chapter for two alternate specifications of seismic hazard: 
the PSH-based approach and the SE-based approach.  Obstacles to using the PSH-based 
approach to analyze the functionality ratios of facilities comprising a networked system 
were assessed.  
 The function of a facility within a networked system is affected by the 
functionality of other facilities.  Thus, the functionality ratio of a facility is affected by 
not only its fragility but also the fragility of the entire system.  The PSH-based approach 
generally leads to a facility functionality ratio that is different from what would be 
evaluated by the scenario based approach.  In particular, one may conclude from this 
study that the use of hazard contours from a PSHA will yield a conservative estimate of 
performance of a civil infrastructure network only if the network is exposed to high 
seismic intensities over its entire extent (e.g., 21−PSHA  in Figure 5-17(b)).  In other cases, 
the scenario earthquake based seismic hazard analysis will provide a more accurate 
assessment of damage to a distributed infrastructure system.  However, since the 
functionality ratio of a facility within an infrastructure system is affected by the system 
topology, fragility curves, magnitudes of earthquakes and the locations of their 
epicenters, one cannot generalize the conditions under which the PSHA is suitable for the 
infrastructure system serviceability assessment.  Decision-makers should be cautious 





SERVICEABILITY ASSESSMENT OF DISTRIBUTED 
INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEMS  
 
The electrical power transmission, water and natural gas distribution systems in 
Shelby County, TN are managed by the Memphis Light, Gas and Water Division (Chang 
et al., 1996; Shinozuka et al., 1998).  Shelby County, TN is located approximately 20 to 
100 km from NMSZ and is the largest major population center potentially affected by 
major earthquakes in the NMSZ.  In this chapter, the serviceability assessment of the 
water distribution and electrical power transmission systems under a single scenario 
earthquake is considered.  Along with the evaluation of effects of spatially correlated 
seismic intensity on the serviceability assessment of the infrastructure systems, upper and 
lower bound closed-form solutions for the failure probability of components are derived 
to reduce the computing time.  The effects of infrastructure interdependency on the 
serviceability of the water distribution system are also evaluated by considering electrical 
power availability and the effort of the electrical power backup systems.     
6.1 Serviceability Assessment Procedure 
An infrastructure system is composed of facilities and distributing elements, and 
several steps are required to assess its serviceability.  These steps are summarized in 
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Figure 6-1 Serviceability assessment of an infrastructure system 
 
The “Identification of accessible facilities” step is executed using the Floyd-Warshall 
shortest path algorithm (Floyd, 1962; Warshall, 1962; Papadimitriou and Steiglitz, 1998) 
described in Chapter 3.  The serviceability of the networked system within a region is 
defined as the ratio of the satisfied customer demand to total customer demand within the 
region; the functionality of a facility is defined as the complement failure probability of 




6.2 Description of Networked Electrical Power Transmission and Water 
Distribution Systems 
 The water and electrical power systems in Shelby County consist of numerous 
facilities and widespread distribution networks.  For purposes of illustrating the potential 
significance of network interdependence and to avoid undue complexity, only major 
facilities and trunk distributing elements are considered in this study.    
Figure 6-2 illustrates the main water distribution system in Shelby County.  The 
water system consists of six elevated storage tanks, nine pumping stations and numerous 
water distribution nodes connected by buried pipe (Hwang et al, 1998; French and Jia, 
1997).  Water distribution nodes identified with numbers 16 to 49 are considered as 



















































Figure 6-2 Water System in Shelby County, TN. (modified from Chang et al., 1996) 
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Figure 6-3 illustrates the main electrical power transmission system in Shelby 
County.   The electrical power system consists of eight gate stations, sixteen 23kv 
substations and twenty-one 12kv substations.  Each substation has its own service area 
within which it provides electrical power to customers (Shinozuka et al, 1998).  The 
service area of each substation is represented by the dashed lines in Figure 6-3.  These 
service areas are required to analyze the dependency of the water system on the electrical 
power system when infrastructure interaction is considered.   Since there is no electrical 
power generating plant in Shelby County, large substations in the metropolitan area 
(termed “Gate station”) provide the electric power generated by plants outside the county, 
and are considered as supply facilities for electrical power.  The 23kv and 12kv electrical 
power substations numbered from 9 to 45 are considered as demand facilities.  Electrical 
transmission lines are considered as distributing elements which route the electrical 


































Figure 6-3 Electrical power system in Shelby County, TN. (modified from Shinozuka et al., 1998) 
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6.3 Damage Assessment of Network Components 
6.3.1 Damage Assessment of Distributing Elements 
 Water and electrical power are delivered from supply facilities to customers 
through demand facilities and distributing elements.  It is assumed that damage to 
electrical power distribution systems can be assessed from the damage to transmission 
towers since the transmission lines, which are suspended from the transmission towers, 
are highly compliant and thus are essentially free from seismic excitation (Jin et al., 
2002).   Similarly, it is assumed that damage to the distributing elements in the water 
system can be assessed from the damage to water mains. 
Previous research analyzing the seismic vulnerability of water pipes has led to 
relations between seismic intensity and pipe break density (Katayama et al, 1975; Eguchi, 
1991; O'Rourke and Ayala, 1993).   The Guidelines prepared by the American Lifeline 
Alliance (ALA) (American Lifelines Alliance, 2001) suggests that damage to water pipe 
caused by strong ground motion can be expressed as a function of peak ground velocity 
(PGV): 
 ( ) PGVKRR ⋅⋅= 00187.01        (6-1) 
where RR is the repair ratio, which is the number of pipe breaks per 1000 feet (305 m) of 
pipe length,  K1 is a coefficient determined by the pipe material, pipe joint type, pipe 
diameter and soil condition, and PGV has the units of in/sec.  Water pipes installed in the 
Memphis area before 1960 were unlined cast iron;  those installed between 1960 and 
1975 were cement-lined cast iron and ductile iron, and those installed after 1975 were 
ductile iron.  Only large-diameter water mains, with diameters from 6 inches to 48 inches 
(152 mm – 1,220 mm) (Shinozuka et al, 1992; Hwang et al., 1997; Shinozuka, 1998), are 
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considered in this study.  Considering the typical water main and soil conditions in 
Memphis, it is assumed that K1=0.5 (ALA, 2001).    
 In addition to strong ground motion, water pipes can be damaged due to 
permanent ground displacement (PGD) (Eguchi, 1983; Porter et al., 1992; ALA, 2001).  
The ALA Guidelines suggest that damage to water pipe caused by PGD due to mainly 
liquefaction can be estimated as follows (ALA, 2001): 
 ( ) 319.02 06.1 PGDKRR ⋅⋅=        (6-2) 
where K2 is a coefficient determined by the pipe material and the pipe joint type.  
According to Broughton et al. (2001), the flood plains along the Wolf, Loosahatchie and 
Mississippi Rivers in Shelby County may be susceptible to liquefaction.  However, 
Broughton’s liquefaction susceptibility map (Broughton et al., 2001) shows that zones 
with very high liquefaction susceptibility cover a relatively small area of Shelby County.  
Furthermore, liquefaction data from the Northridge earthquake (O'Rourke et al, 2000) 
indicated that permanent ground displacements (PGD) due to liquefaction occurred only 
in zones where the PGV exceeded 30 inch/sec. (75cm/sec.), a value that is much larger 
than the attenuated median PGV at any site in Shelby County.  Thus, the possibility of 
pipe break caused by PGD due to liquefaction is neglected. 
Under the assumption that the seismic intensity leads to a uniform demand on a 
water pipe connecting two facilities, the number of pipe breaks can be expressed by the 
Poisson probability law:  




LRR ⋅⋅== ⋅−        (6-3) 
where n is the number of pipe breaks, RR is the repair ratio evaluated by Eq.6-1, and L is 
the length of  pipe segment (expressed in terms of 1000-ft (305-m) segments).  If, in 
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addition, it is assumed that a pipe segment cannot deliver water when the segment has at 












        (6-4) 
In this study, the events describing failure of each pipe segment are assumed to be 
statistically independent.   The detail of the failure probability of a water pipe is discussed 
in subsection 6.4.3. 
6.3.2 Damage Assessment of Facilities 
 The functionality of an earthquake-damaged facility is determined by not only the 
physical damage to the facility itself but also the serviceability of other infrastructure 
systems to which it is connected.  Furthermore, some facilities have backup systems to 
provide electrical power in the event that the functionality of the primary supporting 
system is lost or impaired; in this case, the effect of any backup system also should be 
considered.  For example, some water pumping stations have auxiliary electric power 
generators (Cascos et al., 2004).   A fault tree model, such as the simple model shown in 
Figure 6-4, can be used to integrate the functionalities of the primary and supporting 
systems in the overall system analysis.  
Lost functionality of a facility
Structure failure




Figure 6-4 Fault tree model of the infrastructure interdependency effect on a facility 
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Using this fault tree model and assuming, for simplicity, that a facility is either fully-
functional or non-functional, the probability of lost functionality of an earthquake-
damaged water facility can be presented as; 
( )[ ]BackupPowerPhysicalf FFFPP ∩∪=       (6-5) 
where fP  is the probability of lost functionality of a water facility, PhysicalF is the event 
that the water facility loses its function due to physical damage,  PowerF  is the event that 
the necessary electrical power is not supplied to the water facility due to the lost function 
of an electrical power substation whose service area includes this water facility, and 
BackupF  is the event that the electrical power backup system fails to function and cannot 
supply electrical power to the water facility.  The analysis of this fault tree can be 
performed using the reliability block diagram in Figure 3-6 or the following structure 
function: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )BackupPowerPhysical xxxx ⋅−⋅−−= 111φ      (6-6) 
where xPhysical=1 if the water facility is physically non-damaged after an earthquake, and 
xPhysical=0 otherwise.  Similarly, if electrical power is available to the facility, xPower=1; 
otherwise xPower=0.  If the backup system is non-damaged, xBackup=1; otherwise xBackup=0.  
Thus, ( )xφ =1 if the facility maintains the function after an earthquake; otherwise 
( )xφ =0.  Because of the characteristic of the structure function, x• and ( )xφ  can take 
either 1 or 0.  These simple models are based on the assumption that the facility is either 
fully functioning or non-functioning. 
 The seismic intensities affecting a facility and its backup system at a specific site 
are assumed to be perfectly correlated due to the proximity of the facility and backup 
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system, and thus are evaluated at the same seismic intensity.  In contrast, intensities 
affecting facilities and backup systems at different sites are assumed to be stochastically 
independent.  It is assumed that only water pumping stations have backup electrical 
power facilities.  
 The probability of physical damage to a facility is modeled by the seismic 
fragilities that are presented in the HAZUS MH (FEMA, 2003) for various lifeline 
facilities.  All fragilities are modeled by log-normal distribution functions that describe 
the probabilities of entering five damage states (DS), ranging from I (minor) to V 
(complete), as functions of peak ground acceleration (PGA).  As an illustration, Table 6-1 
summarizes the parameters of the fragility curves for facilities in the water and electrical 
power systems having damage state V.  The water distribution nodes in the water 
distribution system (Figure 6-2) are assumed to be undamaged since they are simply the 
branch points in the piping system needed to distribute the water to customers.  The 
fragilities defined by the parameters in Table 6-1 are plotted in Figure 6-5.  As the 
fragility curve for a backup system, the fragility curve for 12kv substation is used in this 
study. 
Table 6-1 Parameters of fragility curves (DS.V) 
Median (g) Beta
Gate station 0.47 0.40
23km substation 0.70 0.40
12kv substation 0.90 0.45
Elevated water storage tank 1.50 0.60
Pumping station 1.50 0.80  
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Figure 6-5 Fragility curves of facilities 
 
6.4 Serviceability Assessment of a Networked System subjected to Correlated 
Seismic Intensities 
When a networked system has a series structure, the function is maintained if and 
only if all components within the networked system are functioning.  When a networked 
system has a parallel structure, the function is maintained if at least one component 
within the networked system is functioning. A general networked system is modeled as a 
combination of the two system structures. 
6.4.1 Generation of Spatially Correlated Seismic Intensity 
The failure probability of a networked system which has a series structure can be 
calculated as follows: 
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where ( )•P  is the probability of an event, SF  is the failure event of a system, n is the 
number of components in the system and iF  is the failure event of a component i.  Since 
the failure mode of a series system involves component failure events that are neither 
perfectly correlated nor mutually statistically independent, the failure probability of a 
system has (first-order) lower and upper bounds (Cornell, 1967): 











11max      (6-8) 
The failure probability of a networked system is equal to the lower bound when all 
component failure events are stochastically dependent, and is equal to the upper bound 
when all component failure events are statistically independent. 















        (6-9) 
The failure probability of a system with a parallel structure has upper and lower bounds: 









≤≤−−∑      (6-10) 
The failure probability of the system is equal to the lower bound when all component 
failure events are statistically independent, and is equal to the upper bound when all 
component failure events are stochastically dependent.  As a practical matter, this lower 
bound is approximately zero in realistic systems. 
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Since components within a networked system are distributed over a geographical 
area in which the intensity of ground motion can be modeled as a stochastic field, seismic 
intensities at the locations of components from the scenario earthquake are correlated.    
Seismic intensity is often modeled by a log-normal random variable since an attenuated 
seismic intensity at the site is modeled as a product of a function of earthquake 
magnitude, epicentral distance to the site, fault characteristics and local site 
characteristics (see Sec.3.4.2 of Kramer (1996) for details).  Thus, to evaluate network 
reliability, a method for generating vectors of correlated lognormal random variables is 
required.  A mathematical approach to generate a correlated log-normal random vector is 
illustrated in Kiureghian and Liu (1986) and Ditlevsen and Madsen (1996). 
6.4.2 Bounds on Failure Probabilities of Facilities 
  As noted previously, Takada and Shimomura (2003, 2004), Shimomura and 
Takada (2005) and Wang and Takada (2005) found that the correlation of logarithmic 
residuals of seismic intensities at two sites can be evaluated using Equations 4-17 and 4-
18.  Seldom is there sufficient information on seismic wave propagation or local site 
conditions to define correlation distance b .  Accordingly, we consider two extreme cases: 
perfectly correlated seismic intensities and perfectly independent seismic intensities.  
Statistically independent seismic intensities are generated as follows: 
Xiii XX ε⋅=          (6-11) 
where Xiε  is the residual of seismic intensity, defined by a lognormal distribution.  On 




 Xii XX ε⋅=          (6-12) 
where Xε  is a lognormal random variable, which is the same for all components within a 
networked system. 
6.4.3 Bounds on Failure Probabilities of Distribution Elements   
 The water main is modeled as a line superposed on the stochastic field describing 
seismic intensity and the PGV varies over its length.   Thus, the failure probability of a 
water pipe can be computed by considering the number of pipe breaks to be a spatially 
non-homogeneous Poisson process (Rausand and Hoyland, 2004): 








f dssPGVRRP exp1       (6-13) 
where RR(•) is the repair ratio expressed as a function of PGV(s) (Eq.6-1) which is a 
function of site s, and L is the length of a water pipe.  Since PGV(s) is a continuous 
function along the length of pipe, PGV values at discrete points need to be used.  When a 
single PGV value is used to compute Pf of a water pipe of length L (Figure 6-6(a)), the 
spatial distribution of PGV for a water pipe may not be modeled correctly if the length L 
is too long for the segment to be considered as one discrete component.  In this case, L 
should be divided into a sufficient number of short length water pipe segments, with PGV 













exp1       (6-14) 
where PGVi is a PGV value for a water pipe segment i, iLΔ  is the length of a water pipe 
segment i, and m is the number of water pipe segments. 
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The number of pipe segments required to achieve an accurate estimate of Pf 
depends on the correlation distance, b, of the seismic intensity.   If b=0 km, the seismic 
intensities at the two sites are statistically independent.  Figure 6-7 illustrates the relation 
between the number of segments of water pipe and Pf of the water pipe calculated by 
Eq.6-21 with three correlation distances: b=0 km, 10 km, and 30 km.  The length of the 
water pipe L is 20 km. The distribution of PGV over the length of water pipe increases 
linearly from PGV=12 in/s at one end to PGV=15 in/s at the other end.   The coefficient 
of variation of PGV is 60%.  Figure 6-7 shows that Pf increases as the number of pipe 
segments increases, and that this trend holds for all three correlation distance cases.  In 
other words, if the number of segments is small, there is a potential risk that Pf will be 
underestimated.   Thus, a larger number of segments should be chosen to avoid 
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Figure 6-6 PGV distribution along a water pipe:  
(a) An original water pipe and its reliability block diagram  




































Figure 6-7 Relation between number of segmentation of a water pipe and failure probability of a 
water pipe 
 
As with the facilities, determination of correlation distance b in Eq.4-17 is 
problematic.  Thus, two extreme cases (perfectly correlated seismic intensities and 
perfectly independent seismic intensities) are considered.  When a segmented water pipe 
is modeled as a series system with short segment lengths (Figure 6-6(b)), an upper-bound 
estimate of failure probability is obtained if the PGVs are modeled as statistically 
independent random variables, and has a lower bound if the PGVs are modeled as 




The repair ratio RR  is actually a function of PGV, and thus is a random variable.  
Removing the conditioning on RR and assuming that the seismic intensities are 
statistically independent, the failure probability is as follows:  
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  (6-15) 
where Ni is the number of pipe breaks within a pipe segment i, pgvi is the PGV for  pipe 
segment i, described by a lognormal random variable whose median is computed by the 
attenuation relationship and coefficient of variation is 60%, f•(•) is a lognormal 
probability density function, iLΔ  is assumed to be same in all elements, C=K•0.00187, 
iPGV  is the median value of PGV for a water pipe segment i, and PGViε  is the residual of 
the PGV for a water pipe segment i.  To avoid underestimating the failure probability, the 




































1     (6-16) 
where PGVμ  is the average PGV for the entire length of pipe. 
Conversely, when the seismic intensities along the pipe length are perfectly 



















































     (6-17) 
The last right-hand member in Eq.6-24 has a similar expression as that under statistically 
independent seismic intensities.  The critical difference is that PGVε , which is the residual 
of the PGV, is assumed to be constant with respect to a pipe segment i.  To avoid the 
underestimation of failure probability, the limit of the expected failure probability is 















































   (6-18) 
where ( )•
PGV
Gε  is the moment generating function of PGVε .  Thus, the failure probability 
of a water main is, 
( ) [ ] ( )[ ]PGVfPGV CLEPECLG PGV μμε −−≤≤−− exp11     (6-19) 
The upper and lower bounds in Eq.6-26 are (1) independent of correlation distance, and 
(2) independent of the number of segments used to idealize the pipe.  The first 
characteristic avoids the difficulty of determination of the autocorrelation in intensity 
when there is insufficient data.  The second characteristic removes the dependence of 
failure probability on pipe segmentation (which is a modeling choice rather than a 
physical attribute of the water distribution system) and enhances the efficiency of the 
computation of network serviceability.  Though the use of Eqs.6-18, 6-19, 6-23 and 6-25 
will cause errors in the results of serviceability assessment of infrastructure systems, this 
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enables seismic intensities to be generated without information on correlation distance b  
(Eq.4-17).  A comparison of exact and approximate failure probabilities is made later in 
this chapter. 
6.5 Serviceability Assessment of Infrastructure Systems 
Using the de-aggregation analysis provided by the USGS (2002a) at the City of 
Memphis, a scenario earthquake, with magnitude Mw 7.7 and epicenter located at 35.3N 
and 90.3W, is selected to apply the serviceability assessment of the water distribution 
system and the electrical power transmission system.  This scenario earthquake is the 
Maximum Probable Earthquake (MPE) at a 2475-year return period, which corresponds 
to 2% probability of exceedance in 50 years (Table 4-3).  The average epicentral distance 
of this scenario event to the city of Memphis is about 33 km. 
The seismic intensity at a site from an earthquake with magnitude Mw and 
epicentral distance R from that site is determined by an attenuation relationship, modified 
by the local soil conditions.  The attenuation relationships illustrated in Section 4.1 
describe the median ground motion intensity (defined as either peak ground or spectral 
parameters) as a function of moment magnitude Mw and epicentral distance R.  There is 
considerable scatter around the estimated median, and the coefficients of variation (COV) 
in the ground motions predicted by these attenuation curves typically are on the order of 
0.50-0.70.  According to Hwang et al. (1998), Shelby County is located within the 
Mississippi embayment, and the local site conditions in the region correspond mainly to 
site categories D and E as specified in the 2003 NEHRP Provisions (FEMA, 2004).    
In this study, the attenuation relationships for PGA and PGV proposed by 
Atkinson and Boore (1995) is selected since they both are based on the same ground 
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motion records and computational approach; the coefficient of variation associated with 
this relationship, which measures the aleatory uncertainty in ground motion intensity at 
the site (Toro et al., 1997) is set equal to 0.60.   The soil condition is assumed to be 
categorized by site category D over the entire area in the absence of detailed information 
on local site conditions, and the local soil amplification factors defined in the 2003 
NEHRP Provisions (FEMA, 2004) are used. 
 The procedure followed for serviceability assessment of the infrastructure systems 
following an earthquake, considering the effects of the infrastructure interdependency 
and the effort of the electrical power backup system under the correlated seismic 
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In most cases, customers in a particular service area receive water or power from a 
facility serving that area.  Thus, the serviceability of the water distribution system 
following the earthquake is directly related to the number of water distribution nodes in 
the network which remain accessible from at least one supply facility following the 
earthquake.  In a similar way, the serviceability of the power system following the 
earthquake is determined from the number of substations which are accessible from at 

































      (6-20) 
where S is the serviceability ratio of an infrastructure system defined on the domain [0,1], 
where s = 0 implies complete loss of serviceability, while s = 1 implies unimpaired 
function, iω  is a weighting factor assigned to facility i, and Xi represents the 
functionality ratio of facility i.  Since only two states - non-functioning and fully-
functioning - are considered, Xi is modeled as the outcome of a Bernoulli trial: 1=iX  if 
facility i is non-damaged and can receives its commodity from at least one supply facility 
(full-function), otherwise 0=iX  (non-function).  N is the number of water distribution 
nodes or number of substations.  The weighting factor iω is dependent on the goal of the 
serviceability assessment.  For example, if the number of customers who can receive the 
resources after an earthquake is of interest, iω  might be determined by the number of 
customers in the service area of the facility i.  Similarly, the amount of sales in the 
service area of facility i can determine the weighting factor when industrial productivity 
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1        (6-21) 
In this study, the serviceability of the water distribution system and those of the electrical 
power transmission system are determined from the functionality Xi of the water 
distribution nodes and the 23kv and 12kv substations, respectively.  Furthermore, it is 
assumed that all nodes in the water distribution system and all substations in the electrical 
power system have the same importance level for customers.   The serviceability ratio of 
the water distribution system and those of the electrical power transmission system both 
are determined from Eq.6-28.  The mean functionality ratio of water facility i is defined 
as the average of Xi. 
 The evaluation of the average serviceability ratio and the average functionality 
ratio of the water distribution system and those of the electrical power transmission 
system considering the effect of aleatory uncertainty in seismic intensities is performed 
using Monte Carlo simulation, with the number of trials set equal to 10,000.  Since 
general infrastructure systems are comprised of a very large number of facilities and 
distributing elements, the short periodicity of certain pseudo-random number generating 
algorithms may be of concern.  Accordingly, pseudorandom numbers in this analysis are 
generated using the Mersenne Twister algorithm (Matsumoto and Nishimura, 1998) 
which has long periodicity (219937-1) and 623-dimensional equi-distribution, while the 
pseudo-random numbers generated by the classical and widely used linear congruential 
generating algorithm has at most 5-dimensional equi-distribution.  The programming 
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source codes written in C-language provided by Matsumoto (1997) and Wada (2002) are 
used in this study. 
6.5.1 Water Distribution System  
Figure 6-9 illustrates the effects of spatially correlated seismic intensity on the 
serviceability of the water distribution system.  The serviceability is evaluated with three 
correlation distances: b=0 km (the seismic intensities are statistically independent each 
other), 30 km and Infinity in Eq.4-17 for both PGA and PGV.  The case b=Infinity 
represents the case when seismic intensities are perfectly correlated.  In Figure 6-9, items 
identified as 16 to 49 represent water distribution nodes, as shown in Figure 6-2.     
Figure 6-9 shows that the functionality ratio at water distribution nodes ranges 
widely, from 0.01 at node 28 to 0.67 at node 44 when b=0 km, from 0.05 at node 28 to 
0.70 at node 44 when b=30km, and from 0.07 at node 28 to 0.71 at node 44 when 
b=Infinity.  This range of values can be attributed to the relative distances of the nodes 
from water storage tanks which supply water to the node, the damage of such water 
storage tanks, and the redundancy of the earthquake-damaged water system.  Conversely, 
if the demand facilities are located far from supply facilities (e.g. node 39) or if their 
redundancy of accessibility is poor (e.g. node 28), their residual serviceability ratio 
becomes small. 
Figure 6-9 reveals three trends: (1) the functionality ratio of any water distribution 
node increases when the spatial correlation of seismic intensity is stronger, (2) the 
functionality ratio changes in some nodes (e.g., nodes 20 to 27 and 29 to 42) more than 
others when the functionality ratio in b=0km and in b=30km are compared, and (3) the 
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functionality ratio changes slightly in all nodes when the functionality ratio in b=30km 
and in b=Infinity are compared.   
The first trend implies that the Shelby County water distribution system behaves 
more like a series system than a parallel system since the components connected in series 
return the larger serviceability ratio (the complement of system failure probability) in the 
networked system with stronger correlation effect (Eq.6-8).  This implies that the water 
distribution system has small redundancy as a networked system.  The serviceability ratio 
of the entire water distribution system shows that the water distribution system behaves 
more like a series system. 
The second trend appears at water distribution nodes that either are located a long 
distance from any elevated water storage tank or are located in northwestern Shelby 
County, which is close to the epicenter of the scenario earthquake used in this study.  In 
either situation, the trend reflects the fact that the range of system failure probabilities 
shown in Eq.6-8 is large when the failure probabilities of components are large.  This 
means either that the components are located closer to the epicenter of the scenario 
earthquake or that the number of components locating between elevated water storage 
tanks and the water distribution node focused on is large. 
The third trend is explained by Figure 6-7, which shows that the system failure 
probability changes more rapidly when correlation distances are short under a specific 
number of segments (e.g. Pf with b=0km and b=30km under N=10). 
From the results shown in Figure 6-9, one might conclude that the effect of 
spatially correlated seismic intensity on the serviceability assessment of the water 
distribution system is not negligible, especially in case that either the function of 
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components located close to the epicenter of the scenario earthquake or the function of 
components located far from water storage tanks is evaluated, and in case that the 
correlation distance is assumed to be relatively small (e.g. b=0~30km in this study).  
Furthermore, the importance of spatial correlation effects is clear when the serviceability 
ratio of the entire water distribution system is evaluated. 
 
 
Figure 6-9 Functionality ratio of water distribution nodes (effect of spatially correlated seismic 
intensity) 
 
Figure 6-10 illustrates the results of three additional serviceability analyses: (1) 
Functionality of the water distribution system is not dependent on electrical power 
availability ( φ=PowerF  in Eq.6-5 or xPower=0 in Eq.6-6); (2) Functionality of the water 


























b=0km (Serviceability ratio =  0.245 )
b=30km (Serviceability ratio =  0.336 )
b=Inf. (Serviceability ratio =  0.363 )
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power sources are not installed or are unavailable ( Ω=BackupF  in Eq.6-5 or xBackup=1);  
and (3) Functionality of the water distribution system is dependent on electrical power 
availability and backup power systems are installed.    
The dependence of serviceability of the water distribution system on availability 
of electrical power is significant.  Furthermore, the impact of power backup systems on 
serviceability of the water system is noticeable; Figure 6-10 shows that the functionality 
of the water distribution nodes are improved if a source of electrical power can be 
assured.   Thus, availability of backup electrical power systems following a large 




Figure 6-10 Functionality ratio of water distribution system (effect of infrastructure interdependency 



























Independent (Serviceability ratio =  0.336 )
Interdependent (Serviceability ratio =  0.267 )
Interdependent+Backup (Serviceability ratio =  0.304 )
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6.5.2 Electrical Power Transmission System 
Figure 6-11 illustrates the effects of spatially correlated seismic intensity on the 
serviceability of the electrical power transmission system.  The serviceability is evaluated 
with three correlation distances: b=0 km, 30 km and Infinity in Eq.4-17.  In Figure 6-11, 
items identified as 9 to 45 represent electrical power substations, as shown in Figure 6-3. 
Figure 6-11 shows that the functionality ratio of substations ranges widely from 
0.24 at node 24 to 0.79 at node 9 when b=0 km, from 0.35 at node 24 to 0.74 at node 44 
when b=30km, and from 0.37 at node 24 to 0.71 at node 9 when b=Infinity.  This range 
of values can be attributed to their relative distances from the gate stations which supply 
power to the substation, the damage of such substations, and the redundancy of the 
earthquake-damaged electrical power transmission system. 
In contrast to the results for the water distribution system shown in Figure 6-9, the 
increase in correlation distance does not always cause the functionality ratio of the 
substations to increase.  This implies that electrical power transmission system behaves 
as a mix of parallel and series systems.   Since the components connected in series return 
the larger serviceability ratio (the complement of system failure probability) in the 
networked system with stronger correlation effect (Eq.6-8) and the components 
connected in parallel return the smaller serviceability ratio with stronger correlation 
effect (Eq.6-10), some substations (e.g. 9, 10, 27 and 32) behave more like component in 
a parallel system and other substations (e.g. 19, 22, 23 and 24) behave more like 
components in a series system.  The mixed effects of connection in series and in parallel 
are apparent in some substations (e.g. 16, 20 and 44).  The serviceability ratio of the 




Figure 6-11 Functionality ratio of electrical power substations (effect of spatially correlated seismic 
intensity) 
   
6.5.3 Serviceability Bounds on Water Distribution System 
 The serviceability bounds of the water distribution system are evaluated by the 
approximate procedure developed above, leading to an estimate of bounds of the mean 
functionality ratio at each water distribution node and bounds of the mean serviceability 
ratio of the entire water distribution system.   
 Figure 6-12 illustrates the result of the serviceability assessment of the water 
system under the assumption that the correlation distance b=30 km for PGA and PGV, 
which is reasonable according to Takada and Shimomura (2003 and 2004), Shimomura 
and Takada (2004) and Wang and Takada (2005).  Infrastructure interdependency is not 
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The exact solutions are obtained by dividing each water main into 20 equal-length 
segments; at this level of discretization, about 710275 ⋅  iterations are needed to obtain all 
exact solutions of the water distribution system by the Floyd-Warshall algorithm.  The 
upper bound on failure probability of a water pipe is computed under the assumption that 
the PGVs along the length of pipe are statistically independent using Eq.6-23, to avoid 
difficulties in determining the number of pipe segments and to reduce computing time; 
this yields a lower bound (LB) solution to the functionality ratio of each distribution node 
and the serviceability ratio of the water distribution system.  In contrast to the exact 
solution, only about 310118 ⋅  iterations are required to obtain all LB solutions from the 
Floyd-Warshall algorithm.  The lower bound on failure probability of a water pipe is 
computed under the assumption that the PGVs along the length of pipe are perfectly 
correlated using Eq.6-28; this yields a upper bound (UB) solution on a functionality ratio 
of each distribution node and a serviceability ratio of the water distribution system.  But, 
since no closed-form solution for the moment generating function of the log-normal 
distribution used for PGVε  in Eq.6-25 exists, there is no advantage to obtaining UB 
solutions in this case study.  However, since UB solutions are unconservative, this is not 
a practical problem.  In this case study, UB solutions are evaluated by segmenting each 
water main into 20 equal-length segments using Eq.6-24 with m=20, in place of using the 
closed-form (Eq.6-25). 
 As would be expected, the exact functionality ratio in Figure 6-12 is between the 
upper bound (UB) and the lower bound (LB).  The maximum difference between the 
upper and the lower bounds of functionality ratio is 0.082 at distribution node 40; the 
maximum difference between the exact functionality ratio and the lower bound is 0.063 
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at distribution node 20, which is small enough for the LB solution to be used in practical 
applications.  The difference in serviceability ratio between UB and LB is 0.051, while 
the difference between the exact solution and the LB is 0.041.  The required number of 
iterations to obtain a LB solution from the Floyd-Warshall algorithm is only 0.0043% of 
the number required to obtain an exact solution.  Thus, the LB solution for network 



























UB (Serviceability ratio =  0.346 )
Exact (Serviceability ratio =  0.336 )
LB (Serviceability ratio =  0.295 )
 
Figure 6-12 Bounds on functionality ratio of water distribution system (correlation distance b=30km) 
 
6.6 Summary 
 The serviceability of the water distribution system and the electrical power 
transmission system following a scenario earthquake was presented in this chapter, taking 
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into account spatial correlations in seismic demand on facilities within the system.  
Seismic intensities (PGA and PGV) representing demands on the network system were 
modeled as a stochastic field along connecting elements in the distribution network.  
Lower and upper bounds on the failure probability were obtained by assuming that the 
seismic intensity field is fully correlated over the network or is effectively uncorrelated 
from point to point.  The bounds are independent of how the piping system is discretized 
in the network analysis, which otherwise would increase the dimensions of the random 
vectors required to model spatial variation in seismic demands on the system.    
The feasibility of this method was demonstrated by an application to the water 
distribution system in Shelby County, TN.  The case study revealed that the functionality 
of the water distribution nodes and the serviceability of the water distribution system 
evaluated by using the upper and lower bounds are sufficiently close to the exact results 
that the bounds would be useful for practical risk mitigation decision purposes.   A lower 
bound solution can be obtained at only 0.0043% of the computational effort required for 
an exact solution.  Since the number of iterations required to obtain a Floyd-Warshall 
solution to network serviceability is proportional to the cube of the number of nodes in 
the system, as described in Section 3.3, the lower bound solution should be even more 




SERVICEABILITY ASSESSMENT BASED ON UNIFORM SEISMIC 
HAZARD CONTOURS 
 
In Chapter 6, the serviceability of infrastructure systems under a scenario 
earthquake was assessed.  However, such an assessment for a single scenario earthquake, 
which occurs with a low but non-quantified probability, does not provide enough 
information to estimate the cost of insurance to cover the expected losses due to a 
spectrum of possible earthquakes impacting the community, to design new infrastructure 
systems, and to retrofit existing infrastructure systems.  The expected serviceability of 
infrastructure systems due to a spectrum of possible earthquakes, ranging from the 
frequent to infrequent, is required for these decisions.   While the probabilistic seismic 
hazard map for a stipulated return period provided in the ASCE Standard 7 (ASCE, 2005) 
and the USGS (2002b) can be applied for a site-specific seismic hazard analysis, such 
maps may not be suitable to evaluate the serviceability of a spatially distributed 
infrastructure system (Eguchi, 1991b; Ishikawa and Kameda, 1994; Chang et al., 2000; 
McGuire, 2001; Adachi and Ellingwood, 2007a), for the reasons introduced in Chapter 5.    
In this chapter, the drawbacks of using a probabilistic seismic hazard analysis to 
assess risk to a spatially distributed infrastructure system, which were identified using the 
simple networked systems in Chapter 5, are explored more fully using the electrical 
power transmission system in Shelby County, TN. (Adachi and Ellignwood, 2007c).  The 
expected serviceability of the water distribution system and the electrical power 
transmission system is evaluated by considering the spectrum of possible earthquakes for 
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six return periods (4975, 2475, 975, 475, 224 and 108 years) (Adachi and Ellignwood, 
2007d). 
7.1 Applicability Assessment of PSHA to a Real Networked System 
In Chapter 5, the functionality ratios of facilities evaluated by the probabilistic 
seismic hazard (PSH) based and the scenario earthquake (SE) based approaches were 
compared using simple networked systems impacted by only two seismic zones.  In this 
section, the PSH-based and the SE-based characterizations of hazard are applied to the 
evaluation of the electrical power distribution system in Shelby County, TN shown in 
Figure 6-3.  
7.1.1 Determination of Scenario Earthquakes 
 As illustrated in Ch.4, a PSHA considers all possible earthquakes affecting a 
region of interest.  De-aggregation analysis determines the contributing earthquakes with 
their relative contributions at a certain return period.  In this study, such earthquakes and 
corresponding spatially distributed peak ground accelerations (PGAs) are obtained from a 
deaggregation analysis at Memphis provided by the U.S. Geological Survey (2002a) for a 
2475-year return period earthquake event, which corresponds to a 2% probability of 
exceedance in 50 years (Figure 4-8).  This de-aggregation analysis reveals a large number 
of contributing earthquakes at this probability level; for the purposes herein, the ten most 
likely earthquakes, which contribute about 75% of the total hazard, are selected (Table 
7-1).  In order to determine a PGA that is comparable to the PGA obtained directly from 
the PSHA and to have a consistent basis for comparison, the original contribution ratios 
are normalized in the last column of Table 7-1 to sum to 100%.  The epicentral distances 
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R shown in Table 7-1 are the approximate distances between each epicenter and 
Memphis.  The attenuation relationship proposed by Toro, Abrahamson et al. (1997) with 
coefficient of variation of 0.6 is used to evaluate the PGA at the sites of facilities 
comprising the electrical power transmission system.  The maximum and minimum PGA 
at all facility sites due to each scenario earthquake and the weighted PGA by the 
modified contribution ratio are shown in Table 7-2. 
 

































Table 7-2 Maximum and minimum PGA 
Event 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Weighted PGA
maxPGA (g) 0.62 0.55 0.50 0.73 0.30 0.33 0.35 0.40 0.27 0.31 0.45
minPGA (g) 0.28 0.25 0.23 0.32 0.15 0.17 0.20 0.23 0.16 0.19 0.27
 
7.1.2 Serviceability Assessment of the Electrical Power Transmission System under 
Uniform Seismic Hazard 
 The study of simple networked systems in Chapter 5 revealed that the fragilities 
of both individual facilities and the structure of the system network affect the 
functionalities of facilities within the network.  Thus, two fragility curves corresponding 
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to “complete” and “extensive” damage states, which are defined in HAZUS MH (FEMA, 
2003), are used to model the performance of each facility in this section.  The fragilities 
are modeled by lognormal distributions, with parameters listed in Table 7-3.  The 
serviceability assessment procedure is the same as that illustrated in Section 6.6.  The 
number of networks analyzed by Monte Carlo simulation for purposes of estimating 
functionality and serviceability is 10,000, with the pseudorandom numbers being 
generated by the Mersenne Twister algorithm (Matsumoto and Nishimura, 1998) as 
before. 
 
Table 7-3 Parameters of fragility curves (from FEMA, 2003) 
median (g) beta median (g) beta median (g) beta
Complete 0.47 0.40 0.70 0.40 0.90 0.45
Extensive 0.20 0.35 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.45




7.1.3 Results and Discussion 
 The functionality ratios of substations and the average functionality ratios are 
shown in Figures 7-1 and 7-2 for the “complete” and “extensive” damage states identified 
above.  The numbers on the horizontal axis correspond to the substation numbers in 
Figure 6-3.  Figure 7-1 shows that the functionality ratios of most substations evaluated 
by the PSH-based analysis are slightly larger than those evaluated by the SE-based 
analysis when the “complete” damage state fragilities are used.  Conversely, Figure 7-2 
shows that the functionality ratios of facilities evaluated by the PSH-based analysis are 
smaller than those evaluated by the SE-based analysis when the “extreme” damage state 
fragility is used.   In this situation, then, using the PSH-based analysis will lead to a 

























SE-based : average = 0.758
PSH-based : average = 0.767
 

























SE-based : average = 0.245
PSH-based : average = 0.182
 
Figure 7-2 Functionality ratios of facilities: extensive damage state 
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The trends shown in Figures 7-1 and 7-2 can be explained by the relation between 
the system fragility curve and the survivor function in Figures 7-3 and 7-4.  In Figures 7-
3 and 7-4, aE  and bE  represent seismic intensities due to scenario earthquakes identified 
in Table 7-1: ( )1021 ,,,min EEEEa L=  and ( )1021 ,,,max EEEEb L= .  (The eight 
remaining intensities are not shown for simplicity).   In contrast, the seismic intensity 
from the PSHA  represents the weighted average of the ten seismic intensities ( 1E , 2E ,…, 
10E ).  The seismic intensity from the PSHA is within the domain [ ]ba EE , . 
When the fragility curves for the “complete” damage state are used, Figure 7-3 
shows that the functionality ratio determined from the SE-based analysis CompleteSERs ,  is 
smaller than the functionality ratio from the PSH-based analysis CompletePSHARs , .  On the 
other hand, when the fragility curves for the “extensive” damage state are used, Figure 
7-4 shows that the estimated failure probabilities are higher, even though the ten seismic 
intensities ( 1E , 2E ,…, 10E ) and the PSHA  are the same as those in Figure 7-3.  The 
functionality ratio due to the SE-based analysis ExtensiveSERs ,  is larger than the functionality 















































Figure 7-3 Functionality ratios evaluated under different system fragility curves:  







































Figure 7-4 Functionality ratios evaluated under different system fragility curves:  
Fragility curve of extensive damage state 
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7.2 Serviceability Assessment under Uniform Seismic Hazard  
 The probabilistic seismic hazard (or uniform hazard) map is not suitable for 
assessing performance of spatially distributed infrastructure systems, and yet all possible 
earthquakes should be considered to evaluate the serviceability of infrastructure systems 
at a stipulated seismic hazard.  According to Frankel et al. (1996 and 2002), earthquakes 
have occurred not only in the New Madrid seismic zone (NMSZ) but in the entire region 
surrounding Shelby County, TN, referred to as the background source zone.  To evaluate 
the serviceability of infrastructure systems under a specified seismic hazard, the 
following steps should be followed: 
1. For serviceability assessment for earthquakes identified as coming from the 
NMSZ; 
1.1. One earthquake from the NMSZ is generated, whose magnitude and 
epicenter are randomly determined; the frequency of magnitudes and 
epicenters are determined from the results of deaggregation assessment at 
Shelby County at a specific return period. 
1.2. The serviceability of the infrastructure system is assessed using the 
earthquake generated in Step 1.1 as a scenario earthquake, as illustrated in 
Chapter.6. 
1.3. Steps 1.1-1.2 are repeated to generate enough number of scenario 
earthquakes which include earthquakes with small frequency in the NMSZ.  
As an independent check, a plot of epicenters on the geographical map and a 
graph of magnitudes vs. epicentral distances should be compared with the 
results of the USGS deaggregation assessment used in Step 1.1. 
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2. For serviceability assessment due to earthquakes from the background source 
zones; 
2.1. One earthquake from the background source zones whose magnitude and 
epicenter are randomly determined is generated.  The frequency of 
magnitudes and epicenters are determined from the results of deaggregation 
assessment at Shelby County at the specified return period. 
2.2. The serviceability of the infrastructure system is assessed using the 
earthquake generated in Step 2.1 as a scenario earthquake, as illustrated in 
Chapter 6. 
2.3. Steps 2.1-2.2 are repeated to generate a sufficient number of scenario 
earthquakes, which include earthquakes with small frequency in the NMSZ.  
A plot of epicenters on the USGS de-aggregation map and a graph of 
magnitudes vs. epicentral distances is compared with the results of de-
aggregation assessment used in Step 1. 
3. The average serviceability of the infrastructure system is computed by averaging 
the serviceability due to the earthquakes from NMSZ and the serviceability due to 
the earthquakes from the background source zones.  The frequency ratios for the 
earthquakes from the NMSZ and from the background seismic zones are used as 
the weighting factors for averaging. 
4. Steps 1-3 are repeated at different return periods, and a plot of the serviceability 
ratio vs. the annual frequency, which is the inverse the return period, is 
developed. 
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The generation of earthquakes from the NMSZ and from the background source zone is 
explained next. 
7.2.1 Modeling Earthquakes from the New Madrid Seismic Zone 
 According to Frankel et al. (1996 and 2002), the New Madrid seismic zone is the 
only major seismic zone near to Shelby County, TN. (Figure 4-6).  As a result of the 
deaggregation analysis for Memphis, the epicenters of earthquakes generated at the 
NMSZ at any return period are aggregated to three specific epicenters.  Table 7-4 
represents the locations of the earthquake epicenters, their magnitudes and their relative 
frequencies at each return period.  The earthquakes whose frequency ratios are in 
boldface are the maximum probable earthquakes (MPE).   
 
Table 7-4 Twelve characteristic earthquakes from NMSZ and their relative frequency 
4975 2475 975 475 228 108
8.0 16.18 12.91 8.16 5.14 3.88 3.74
7.7 36.88 32.71 24.38 16.72 12.92 12.45
7.5 10.88 10.36 8.76 6.51 5.16 4.98
7.3 6.10 6.20 5.97 4.90 4.03 3.90
8.0 7.90 8.50 9.08 8.61 7.65 7.47
7.7 13.00 16.19 21.67 25.22 25.13 24.87
7.5 3.05 4.19 6.56 8.93 9.89 9.94
7.3 1.32 2.00 3.65 5.86 7.45 7.66
8.0 1.72 2.17 2.90 3.52 3.72 3.73
7.7 2.33 3.57 6.22 9.48 11.99 12.39
7.5 0.46 0.83 1.74 3.13 4.63 4.93
7.3 0.17 0.36 0.92 1.99 3.55 3.96


















7.2.2 Modeling Earthquakes from the Background Seismic Source Zones 
 In contrast to the NMSZ, the background seismic source zones are modeled as a 
number of seismic zones which are meshed by 0.2° in latitude and longitude in the CEUS 
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(Frankel et al., 1996 and 2002).  Using the record of historical earthquakes, the a-values 
of the Gutenberg-Richter recurrence law are evaluated (Gutenberg and Richter, 1944; 
Kramer, 1996).  The b-value of the Gutenberg-Richter recurrence low is 0.95, which is 
constant for the entire CEUS (Frankel et al., 2002).  The maximum magnitude 7.5 is used 
for the bounded Gutenberg-Rechter recurrence law (Kramer, 1996).  As results of de-
aggregation analysis, the epicenters of the earthquakes occurring in the background 
seismic source zone are scattered throughout the area surrounding Shelby County at each 
return period (Figures 4-7 to 4-12).  Since it is not feasible to identify each de-aggregated 
earthquake from the result of the de-aggregation analysis, a computer simulation is 
performed to determine the epicenter and the magnitude of earthquakes under the 
following assumptions; 
• The frequency of a de-aggregated earthquake with magnitude (Mw) and epicentral 
distance (R) follows the list which is obtained as a result of the deaggregation 
analysis (e.g. de-aggregated earthquakes for 2475-year return period listed in 
Table 7-5).  Since the deaggregation analysis shows the frequency of each binned 
Mw and R, it is assumed that Mw and R are uniformly distributed within the bin.  
Thus, Mw and R are computed as follows: 
mMM WW Δ+=        (7-1) 
rRR Δ+=         (7-2) 
where M  is the de-aggregated magnitude (e.g. Mw listed in Table 7-5), mΔ  is a 
random number which is uniformly distributed within [-0.1, 0.1), R  is the de-
aggregated epicentral distance (e.g. the epicentral distance listed in Table 7-5) and 
rΔ  is uniformly distributed random number within [-5.0, 5.0). 
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• The epicenter of the earthquake determined in the previous step is determined by 
an epicentral distance (R) and a randomly generated rotational angle (ө) whose 
frequency is distributed between [0°, 360°) based on the number of earthquakes 
identified in the results of deaggregation analyses in each octant (Figure 7-5). 
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Figure 7-5  Determination of the epicenter of the earthquake from the background seismic source 
zone 
 
To confirm the simulated earthquakes generated from the background seismic 
source zones, the map on which the simulated epicenters are plotted and the graph of the 
magnitudes vs. the epicentral distance are compared with a map and the graph obtained 
from the de-aggregation analysis (e.g., Figure 7-6 vs. Figure 4-6 for 2475-year return 
period). 
In Figure 7-6, 2500 simulated earthquakes are plotted.  The relations between the 
epicentral distance and the magnitude agree reasonably well with the results of 
deaggregation analysis shown in Figure 4-6.     
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Figure 7-6 Distributions of epicenters, magnitudes and epicentral distances of simulated earthquakes 
for 2475-year return period 
 
7.2.3 Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Assessment for Infrastructure Systems 
 To evaluate the serviceability of the water distribution system and the electrical 
power transmission system for each return period, the serviceability assessment 
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illustrated in Chapter 6 must be conducted for all possible earthquakes from the sites 
surrounding the infrastructure system at each return period, treating each earthquake as a 
scenario earthquake.  The process is summarized in Figure 7-7.  The process 
“Serviceability assessment” is illustrated in Figure 6-8.  The serviceability assessment for 
the NMSZ is performed twelve times since twelve scenario earthquakes are used as 
characteristic earthquakes within the NMSZ (Table 7-4).  N must be large enough for the 
earthquakes with small frequency to be generated while looping.  In this study, N=5000 
for each return period.   When the loop is finished, 12 results are weighted by their 
frequency ratios in Table 7-4, and N results of the background earthquake source zone 
are arithmetically averaged.  To assess the serviceability of an infrastructure system due 
to the probabilistic seismic hazard, these two results must be averaged using weighting 
factors representing the frequencies of earthquake occurrence at NMSZ and at the entire 
background source zones.  These frequencies, which are obtained from the results of de-
aggregation analysis, are listed as a function of return period in Table 7-6. 
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i = i + 1
Earthquake at the New Madrid seismic zone
i = i + 1 No No
Serviceability under the uniform seismic hazard
Yes Yes
Taking the weighted average of 12 results Taking the arithmetic average of N results
Taking the weighted average
i > 12 i = N
Selection of scenario earthquake
Magnitude and Epicenter










Determination of Mw and R
 
Figure 7-7 Flow chart of the serviceability assessment of the infrastructure systems under PSHA 
 
Table 7-6 Contribution ratio of earthquake source zones to the uniform seismic hazard at Shelby 
County, TN at each return period 
4975 2475 975 475 224 108
NMSZ 74.46 75.76 74.69 67.27 43.15 21.60
Background zones 25.54 24.24 25.31 32.74 56.85 78.40







7.2.4 Serviceability Risk for Networked Systems 
 Following the procedure summarized in the previous section, the serviceability 
ratios of the electrical power transmission system and the water distribution system are 
calculated at 6 return periods.  The parameters used to compute the serviceability ratios 
utilize the following models: 
• The attenuation relationships for PGA and PGV proposed by Atkinson and Boore 
(1995), 
• The local soil amplification factors proposed by the 2003 NEHRP Provisions 
(FEMA, 2004),  
• The correlation distance b in Eq.4-17 for PGA and PGV is 0 km; in other words, 
spatial correlation effects are neglected, 
• The set of the fragility curves for the components of the water distribution system 
proposed  in HAZUS MH (FEMA, 2003), and  
• The infrastructure interdependency effect is not considered for the water 
distribution system. 
 The serviceability ratios of the entire water distribution system and the entire 
electrical power transmission system, which are evaluated using five categories of 
seismic zones or earthquakes, are plotted in Figures 7-14 and 7-15 with respect to the 
annual frequency, which is the reciprocal of the return period: 0.0002 for 4975-year 
return period, 0.0004 for 2475-year return period, 0.0010 for 975-year return period, 
0.0021 for 475-year return period, 0.0045 for 224-year return period and 0.0093 for 108-
year return period.  In Figures 7-14 and 7-15, the curves labeled NMSZ represent 
serviceability ratios computed using only the earthquakes from the NMSZ; curves labeled 
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BGSZ represent the serviceability ratios computed using the earthquakes only from the 
background seismic zone; PSH represents serviceability ratios computed using the 
earthquakes from both the NMSZ and BGSZ, which is the exact solution evaluated by the 
process shown in Figure 7-7; MeanCE represents serviceability ratios computed using the 
mean characteristic earthquake identified in Table 4-3; and MPE represents serviceability 
ratios computed using the MPE listed in Table 4-3.   
 Figure 7-8 shows that the serviceability ratio of the water distribution system in 
Shelby County, which is a moderate seismic region, would be evaluated too 
conservatively if the MPE were chosen as the scenario event; the MeanCE is a better 
scenario earthquake to evaluate the seismic resistance of the water distribution system, 
although the estimated serviceability ratios are on the non-conservative side at larger 




















Figure 7-8 Serviceability ratio of the water distribution system at six annual frequencies 
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Similar to the water distribution system, Figure 7-9 clearly indicates that the use 
of the MPE results in an overly conservative serviceability ratio for the electrical power 
transmission system at any annual frequency except 0.0010; the MeanCE is a better 
scenario earthquake for evaluating the seismic resistance of the system though it results 






















Figure 7-9 Serviceability ratio of the electrical power transmission system at six annual frequencies 
 
7.3 Summary 
The serviceability of the water distribution system and the electrical power 
transmission system in Shelby County, TN under a uniform seismic hazard was evaluated 
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in this chapter.  The earthquakes which occurred at NMSZ and BGSZ were identified 
through a deaggregation analysis.  The earthquakes occurring within the NMSZ were 
modeled as twelve characteristic scenario earthquakes which had deterministic 
magnitudes and epicenters, respectively.  On the other hand, the earthquakes occurring 
within the BGSZ were modeled by 5000 earthquakes whose epicenters and magnitudes 
were randomly determined using the results of deaggregation analysis. 
The serviceability assessments of the water distribution system and the electrical 
power transmission system showed that the maximum probable earthquake, which often 
has been used as a scenario earthquake, may lead to estimates of serviceability ratios of 
both the water distribution system and the electrical power transmission system that are 
considerably in error.  Estimates obtained using the mean characteristic earthquake as a 
scenario event (MeanCE) are closer to exact serviceability ratios in most instances, 
although the MeanCE may occasionally result in unconservative estimates of 




UNCERTAINTY AND SENSITIVITY ASSESSMENT 
 
The serviceability assessment of the water distribution and electrical power 
transmission systems is based on numerous assumptions and modeling parameters: the 
attenuation relationships for PGA and PGV, the local soil amplification factors for PGA 
and PGV, the spatial correlation of PGA and PGV, the water pipe break ratios and the 
fragility curves for the water storage tanks, the water pumping stations, the electrical 
power substations and backup systems.  These modeling parameters affect the 
serviceability and the functionality ratios, and their selection contributes uncertainty to 
the results of the network analysis.  Such uncertainties are classified into two types: 
aleatory uncertainty (inherent randomness) and epistemic uncertainty (knowledge-based 
uncertainty) (Ang and Tang, 2006). 
8.1 Aleatory and Epistemic Uncertainties 
The aleatory uncertainty arises from naturally occurring random factors.  The 
aleatory uncertainty generally cannot be reduced through more information or data, but it 
can be estimated more accurately (with higher confidence) with additional information.  
On the other hand, the source of epistemic uncertainty is incomplete knowledge; such 
uncertainties can be reduced when more information is collected.  The epistemic 
uncertainty contains modeling uncertainty, which represents difference between the 
actual physical process and the simplified model used to predict the physical process, and 
parametric uncertainty, which represents uncertainty in the values of the parameters that 
are used in the model, respectively (Toro et al., 1997; Ang and Tang, 2006).   
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In seismic hazard analysis, a major source of aleatory uncertainty is the variability 
in the ground motion attenuation with respect to the estimated mean or median; this 
uncertainty is modeled by a log-normal distribution, as described previously.  The 
uncertainty is represented numerically by the standard deviation or coefficient of 
variation (or log-standard deviation) of the probability distribution.  On the other hand, 
the epistemic (modeling) uncertainty can be depicted by an event tree model, which 
represents the different modeling assumptions and decisions made by the analyst.  The 
branches extending from each node are assigned weights in such a way that they sum to 
unity.  The weights are assigned by the analyst to reflect the relative confidence in each 
option.  
8.1.1 Source of Uncertainty 
The case studies in the previous chapters included the aleatory uncertainties 
arising from the attenuation of seismic intensity from source to site and the fragility 
curves.  Both uncertainties are modeled by log-normal distributions whose median values 
are determined by the attenuation relationships or the fragility curves.  The log-standard 
deviation is defined to be 60% for the attenuation relationships and is set equal to the 
values listed in Table 6-1 for the fragility curves.  The epistemic uncertainties due to the 
modeling assumptions made in the previous analyses can be analyzed by the event tree 
models shown in Figures 8-1 to 8-3.  
Figure 8-1 represents the event tree model for evaluating the PGA at a site.  In the 
process to evaluate the PGA, four steps are required.  First, the scenario earthquake is 
determined.  For the scenario earthquake-based seismic hazard analysis, the magnitude 
and the epicenter (from the USGS website) are assumed to be unique, and no other choice 
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is considered.  Second, the attenuation relationship must be selected.  For the CEUS, at 
least six attenuation relationships have been proposed (Toro and McGuire, 1987; 
Atkinson and Boore, 1990; Hwang and Huo, 1997; Toro et al., 1997; Toro, 2003; 
Campbell, 2003).  Those equations are given in Eqs.4-6, 4-8, 4-10 to 4-13 and are plotted 
in Figure 4-2 for the case when magnitude Mw is 7.7.   The weighting factor for each 
attenuation relationship is assumed to be 1/6 for purposes of illustration (implying that 
each attenuation law is viewed as equally plausible).  This decision may be controversial.  
For example, the attenuation relationship proposed by Hwang and Huo (1997) may be 
assigned a smaller weighting factor than the other attenuation relationships, reflecting the 
fact that it is less commonly used than the others.  However, Hwang and Huo’s 
attenuation relationship was developed specifically for the Mid-America region, while 
the other attenuation relationships apply to the entire CEUS.  In any event, this 
assignment of weights can reflect the judgment of the analyst and allows variations in the 
serviceability estimates to be traceable directly to this assumption and subsequently 
revised, if necessary.  The local amplification factors for the CEUS are taken from the 
2003 NEHRP Provisions (FEMA, 2004) and Hwang et al. (1997).  Though the 
amplification factor proposed by the 2003 NEHRP Provisions is more widely used for the 
seismic hazard analysis than the amplification factor proposed by Hwang et al. (1997), 
the weighting factor for each site amplification factor is set equal to 0.5, since the Hwang 
et al. (1997) study focused specifically on the CEUS.  The spatial correlation of PGA is 
characterized by the correlation distance shown in Eq.6-17.  Since the correlation 
distance (km) is determined from the domain [ )∞,0 , two extreme values are selected: 0 
km and infinity, implying , respectively, perfect independence and dependence in ground 
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motion intensity at two sites.  The weighting factors for these assumptions of correlation 










































of PGA  
Figure 8-1 Event tree model for the determination of PGA 
 
Similarly, Figure 8-2 represents the event tree model describing the modeling 
assumptions for evaluating the PGV at a site.  Here, two attenuation relationships have 
been proposed for the CEUS, which are shown in Eqs.4-7 and 4-9 (Toro and McGuire, 
1987; Atkinson and Boore, 1990), and their weighting factors are assumed 0.5 for each, 
each relation being equally plausible in the seismological community.  The other 





















































of PGV  
Figure 8-2 Event tree model for the determination of PGV 
 
 Figure 8-3 shows the event tree model for evaluating the serviceability ratio and 
the functionality ratio for the water distribution system and the electrical power 
























































Figure 8-3 Event tree models for the determination of serviceability ratio and functionality ratio of 
water distribution system and electrical power transmission system 
 
In the modeling process summarized in Figure 8-3, five steps are required.  First, 
an infrastructure system is selected.  Second, a set of fragility curves to support the 
system analysis are determined.  For example, HAZUS MH (FEMA, 2003), the ALA 
guideline (ALA, 2001), Eidinger (2001) proposed fragility curves for water storage tanks, 
defined by log-normal distributions with parameters summarized  in Table 8-1.  The 
fragility curves are plotted in Figure 8-4.  HAZUS MH (FEMA, 2003) provides the 
fragility curve for a water pumping station; the parameters are shown in Table 8-1 and 
the fragility is plotted in Figure 6-5.  Ballantyne and Taylor (1991), O'Rourke and Ayala 
(1993), Toprak (1998), O’Rourke and Jeon (1999), the ALA guideline (ALA, 2001) and 
Eidinger (2001), HAZUS MH (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2003) 
developed alternate water pipe break ratio functions, which are listed in Table 8-1 and 
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plotted in Figure 8-5.  Fragilities and water pipe break ratios provided by the ALA 
Guideline (ALA, 2001) and HAZUS MH (FEMA, 2003) are selected because they apply 
to any water pipe; the weighting factor assigned to each source is 0.5.  Fragilities for 
specific electrical power substations have been developed by Pires et al. (1996), Ang et 
al. (1996) and Jin et al. (2002), Hwang and Chou (1998) and Dong and Shinozuka 
(2003); however, since these studies all focus on a specific power substation, only the 
substation fragilities provided by HAZUS MH (FEMA, 2003) are used.  The fragility 
parameters were summarized in Table 6-1 and the fragility curves were plotted in Figure 
6-5. 
 




Median PGA, Beta Median PGA, Beta Vulnerability function
FEMA (2003) 1.50, 0.60 1.50, 0.80 0.3*0.0001*PGV2.25
ALA (2001) 1.00, 0.55 NA 0.5*0.00187*PGV
Eidinger, J. (2001) 1.00, 0.55 NA 0.5*0.00187*PGV
Toprak, S. (1998) NA NA 0.00023*PGV1.62
O’Rourke,M. and Jeon, S.S. (1999) NA NA (PGV/266)1.22
O’Rourke and Ayala (1993) NA NA (PGV/50)2.63





























Figure 8-4 Fragility curves for an elevated water storage tank 
 









O'Rourke and Jeon (1999)














Figure 8-5 Water pipe break density 
 
 Third, for the seismic assessment of the water distribution system, whether the 
infrastructure interdependency effect due to electrical power availability is, or is not, 
considered is selected.   Fourth, when infrastructure interdependency effect is considered, 
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whether or not the power backup system is installed must be selected.  Fifth, only the 
shortest path algorithm is used for the accessibility assessment method.  The last three 
steps (“Power availability”, “Backup system installation” and “Accessibility 
assessment”) are not the sources of epistemic uncertainty.  However, they are included in 
the event trees since they are necessary to complete the accessibility assessment of a 
water distribution system and an electrical power transmission system. 
8.1.2 Reduction of Number of Sets of Modeling Parameters 
 To perform a “full-factorial” analysis of sensitivity, 2304 sets of modeling 
parameters would have to be considered (see Table 8-2: column “Full factorial design”).  
Since this is not practical, the number of sets of modeling parameters must be reduced.  
The theory of experimental design (Cox and Reid, 2000; Wu and Hamad, 2000; Antony, 
2003; Recab and Shaikh, 2005) can be used to reduce the number of experiments by 
neglecting certain higher-order interactions among modeling parameters.  For example, 
when an experiment has four modeling parameters which have two choices each, 24=16 
runs are performed as the full factorial design.  On the other hand, by applying a 
fractional factorial experimental design of resolution IV1, the number of required runs 
can be reduced to 24-1=8 runs (Recab and Shaikh, 2005).  By performing the fractional 
factional experimental design of resolution IV, only the interactions between one 
modeling parameter and one other modeling parameter or two other modeling parameters 
are observed.  Generally speaking, the higher-order interactions are less important (Cox 
and Reid, 2000; Wu and Hamad, 2000; Antony, 2003; Recab and Shaikh, 2005). 
                                                 
1 “Resolution R implies that no effect involving i factors is aliased with effects involving less than R-i 
factors.” (Wu and Hamad, 2000) 
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Thus, for the serviceability assessment of the water distribution and the electrical 
power transmission systems, some modeling parameters are grouped: local soil 
amplification factors, correlation distances and fragility curves.  The local soil 
amplification factors for PGV in the 2003 NEHRP Provisions (FEMA, 2004) are always 
used if the local soil amplification factors for PGV in the 2003 NEHRP Provisions 
(FEMA, 2004) are used, and vice versa.  If bPGA =0 km is used for the correlation 
distance of PGA, bPGV=0 km is also used.  Furthermore, if the fragility proposed in 
HAZUS MH (FEMA, 2003) is used for an elevated water storage tank, the water pipe 
break density proposed in HAZUS also is used.  As a result of this grouping, the 
sensitivity assessment can be performed under 288 sets of modeling parameters 2.  The 
choices of modeling parameters are shown in Table 8-2 (column “Grouping”). 
After the fractional factional experimental design of resolution IV is applied to 
four modeling parameters (attenuation relationships for PGV, local soil amplification 
factors for PGA and PGV, correlation distances for PGA and PGV, and fragility curves 
of components of the water distribution system), 144 combinations3 of modeling 
parameters are required for the sensitivity assessment.  The final choices of modeling 
parameters are shown in Table 8-2 (column “Fractional factorial design of resolution 
IV”) and Table 8-3.  Table 8-4 shows the twenty-four sets of modeling parameters for the 
attenuation relationship for PGA proposed by Toro and McGuire (1987).  A similar 
approach is taken for the other five attenuation relationships for PGA.  
 
                                                 
2 6 (attenuation relationships for PGA) x 3 (infrastructure interdependency effects) x 24 (the full factional 
experimental design) = 288 
3 6 (attenuation relationships for PGA) x 3 (infrastructure interdependency effects) x 24-1 (the fractional 
factional experimental design of resolution IV) = 144 
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Table 8-2 Number of sets of modeling parameters in each step 
Full factorial design Grouping Fractional factorial designof resolution IV
Attenuation relationship
for PGA
Toro and McGuire (1987)
Atkinson and Boore (1990)
Hwang and Huo (1997)
Toro, Abrahamson et al. (1997)
Toro (2003)
Campbell (2003)
Toro and McGuire (1987)
Atkinson and Boore (1990)
Hwang and Huo (1997)
Toro, Abrahamson et al. (1997)
Toro (2003)
Campbell (2003)
Toro and McGuire (1987)
Atkinson and Boore (1990)
Hwang and Huo (1997)





Toro and McGuire (1987)
Atkinson and Boore (1990)
Toro and McGuire (1987)
















































Table 8-3 The sets of modeling parameters in the design of experiments 
Attenuation equation
PGV PGA PGV PGA PGV
Atkinson&Boore NEHRP NEHRP 0km 0km FEMA
Toro&McGuire Hwang Hwang Infinity Infinity ALA
Atkinson&Boore Hwang Hwang 0km 0km ALA
Toro&McGuire NEHRP NEHRP Infinity Infinity FEMA
Atkinson&Boore NEHRP NEHRP Infinity Infinity ALA
Toro&McGuire Hwang Hwang 0km 0km FEMA
Toro&McGuire NEHRP NEHRP 0km 0km ALA
Atkinson&Boore Hwang Hwang Infinity Infinity FEMA





Table 8-4 Design of experiment for one attenuation relationship for PGA 
PGA PGV PGA PGV PGA PGV
1 Toro&McGuire Atkinson&Boore NEHRP NEHRP 0km 0km FEMA Not considered
2 Toro&McGuire Toro&McGuire Hwang Hwang Infinity Infinity ALA Not considered
3 Toro&McGuire Atkinson&Boore Hwang Hwang 0km 0km ALA Not considered
4 Toro&McGuire Toro&McGuire NEHRP NEHRP Infinity Infinity FEMA Not considered
5 Toro&McGuire Atkinson&Boore NEHRP NEHRP Infinity Infinity ALA Not considered
6 Toro&McGuire Toro&McGuire Hwang Hwang 0km 0km FEMA Not considered
7 Toro&McGuire Toro&McGuire NEHRP NEHRP 0km 0km ALA Not considered
8 Toro&McGuire Atkinson&Boore Hwang Hwang Infinity Infinity FEMA Not considered
9 Toro&McGuire Atkinson&Boore NEHRP NEHRP 0km 0km FEMA Considered
10 Toro&McGuire Toro&McGuire Hwang Hwang Infinity Infinity ALA Considered
11 Toro&McGuire Atkinson&Boore Hwang Hwang 0km 0km ALA Considered
12 Toro&McGuire Toro&McGuire NEHRP NEHRP Infinity Infinity FEMA Considered
13 Toro&McGuire Atkinson&Boore NEHRP NEHRP Infinity Infinity ALA Considered
14 Toro&McGuire Toro&McGuire Hwang Hwang 0km 0km FEMA Considered
15 Toro&McGuire Toro&McGuire NEHRP NEHRP 0km 0km ALA Considered
16 Toro&McGuire Atkinson&Boore Hwang Hwang Infinity Infinity FEMA Considered
17 Toro&McGuire Atkinson&Boore NEHRP NEHRP 0km 0km FEMA Considered+Backup
18 Toro&McGuire Toro&McGuire Hwang Hwang Infinity Infinity ALA Considered+Backup
19 Toro&McGuire Atkinson&Boore Hwang Hwang 0km 0km ALA Considered+Backup
20 Toro&McGuire Toro&McGuire NEHRP NEHRP Infinity Infinity FEMA Considered+Backup
21 Toro&McGuire Atkinson&Boore NEHRP NEHRP Infinity Infinity ALA Considered+Backup
22 Toro&McGuire Toro&McGuire Hwang Hwang 0km 0km FEMA Considered+Backup
23 Toro&McGuire Toro&McGuire NEHRP NEHRP 0km 0km ALA Considered+Backup
24 Toro&McGuire Atkinson&Boore Hwang Hwang Infinity Infinity FEMA Considered+Backup
Run
Factor






Following the serviceability assessment using all 144 sets of modeling 
parameters, a numerical average is taken of all resulting serviceability and functionality 
ratios.  The resulting mean values of the serviceability and the functionality ratios (in a 
Bayesian sense) include both aleatory and epistemic uncertainty.   
8.2 Effects of Uncertainties on Serviceability Assessment 
 Using the fault tree models, statistical data and experimental design summarized 
above, the serviceability assessment of the water distribution system and the electrical 
power transmission system considering the effects of uncertainties are performed. 
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8.2.1 Serviceability Assessment considering Aleatory and Epistemic Uncertainty 
under a Scenario Earthquake 
 Figures 8-6 and 8-7 illustrate the serviceability and functionality ratios of the 
water distribution and electrical power transmission systems, respectively, considering 
the effects of aleatory uncertainty and epistemic uncertainty.  In Figure 8-6, the water 
distribution nodes located in northwest Shelby County, which is close to the epicenter of 
the scenario earthquake used in this study, have small functionality ratios compared with 
other water distribution nodes located far from the epicenter since they suffers the larger 
seismic intensities (e.g. nodes 23 and 26).  Furthermore, some water distribution nodes 
located far from any water storage tank also have a smaller functionality ratio than the 
nodes located close to any storage tank (e.g. nodes 28 and 39).  The effects of 
infrastructure interdependency (electrical power availability) on the serviceability 
assessment of the water distribution system are noticeable.  When the infrastructure 
interdependency effects are considered, the functionality ratios of all water distribution 
nodes are decreased because the possibility that electrical power will be unavailable 
decreases the functionality of the water distribution nodes.  This implies that to neglect 
infrastructure interdependency effects leads to un-conservative serviceability estimates.  
Installation of electrical power backup increases the functionality ratios of the all water 
distribution nodes; the recovered functionality ratios approach the functionality ratios of 

























Independent (Serviceability ratio = 0.172)
Interdependent (Serviceability ratio = 0.137)
interdependent w ith backup (Serviceability ratio = 0.16)
`
 
Figure 8-6 Serviceability assessment of water distribution system considering aleatory and epistemic 
uncertainties 
 
 In contrast to the performance of water distribution nodes, electrical substations 
located close to the epicenter do not always exhibit smaller functionality ratios (e.g. 
figure 6-19, substation 25) than those located far from the epicenter.  On the other hand, 
the functionality ratios of substations located far from any gate station are relatively small 
compared with those located closed to any gate station.  This implies that the 
serviceability of the electrical power distribution system is more sensitive to the 
redundancy of the networked system than to the failure probability of individual 




























Serviceability ratio = 0.519
 
Figure 8-7 Serviceability assessment of electrical power transmission system considering aleatory and 
epistemic uncertainties 
 
8.2.2 Serviceability Assessment considering Aleatory and Epistemic Uncertainty 
under a Uniform Seismic Hazard 
 In this section, the serviceability ratios of the water distribution and electrical 
transmission systems in Shelby County are evaluated for uniform seismic hazard at six 
return periods considering aleatory and epistemic uncertainties.  To integrate such 
aleatory and epistemic uncertainties, the serviceability assessment must be performed 
with respect to all possible combinations of modeling parameters, as illustrated in the 
event tree models described previously in Figures 8-1 to 8-3.  Since the serviceability 
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assessment is performed using all earthquakes which are obtained by deaggregation 
analysis of the uniform seismic hazard, the event tree models are also applied to these 
earthquakes.  The sources of uncertainties are discussed in Section 8.1.  The modeling 
parameters were summarized in Tables 8-2 to 8-4. 
 The aleatory uncertainty represented by the attenuation relationships and the 
fragility curves and the epistemic uncertainty represented by the choice of modeling 
parameters, such as attenuation relationships, local soil amplification factors, fragility 
curves of facilities and water pipe break densities, are integrated using the theory of 
experimental design as described in the previous section.  Figures 8-8 and 8-9 show the 
serviceability ratio of the water distribution system and the electrical power transmission 
system considering aleatory and epistemic uncertainties. 
 Figure 8-8 illustrates the serviceability ratios of the water distribution system 
under several assumptions regarding earthquake modeling.   The curve labeled BGSZ 
represents the serviceability ratio computed using only the earthquakes from the 
background seismic zone; NMSZ represents the serviceability ratio computed using only 
the earthquakes from the NMSZ; PSH represents the serviceability ratio computed using 
the earthquakes from both NMSZ and BGSZ, the so-called exact serviceability ratio.  
Since the contribution ratio of the BGSZ increases gradually as the annual frequency 
increases (Table 7-6), the serviceability ratio identified by PSH, which is close to that of 
NMSZ at small annual frequencies, approaches that of the BGSZ as the annual frequency 
increases.  This trend shows the serviceability ratio obtained from considering only 
scenario earthquakes in the NMSZ may underestimate the resistance of the water 
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distribution system to earthquakes with relatively short return periods (e.g. 975-year, 224-



















Figure 8-8 Serviceability assessment of water distribution system considering aleatory and epistemic 
uncertainties under uniform seismic hazard 
 
 Figure 8-9 illustrates the serviceability ratios of the electrical power transmission 
system at the six return periods considered.  As shown in Figure 8-8, the serviceability 
ratio defined by PSH, which is close to that of the NMSZ when the annual frequency is 
small, approaches that of the BGSZ as the annual frequency increases since the 
contribution ratio of the BGSZ increases gradually as the annual frequency increases 
(Table 7-6).  However, this trend is less noticeable than it was in the serviceability 
assessment of the water distribution system (Figure 8-8) since the serviceability ratios 
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following earthquakes from both the NMSZ and BGSZ remain relatively large.  This is 
because the failures of the distribution elements (e.g., electrical power transmission 
towers and cables) in the electrical power network are not considered for the 
serviceability assessment, and the electrical power transmission system has high 




















Figure 8-9 Serviceability assessment of electrical power transmission system considering aleatory and 
epistemic uncertainties under uniform seismic hazard 
 
8.3 Sensitivity Analysis of Serviceability Estimation  
 The proposed serviceability assessment involves numerous modeling parameters 
such as attenuation equations for PGA and PGV, local soil amplification factors for PGA 
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and PGV, correlation distance of PGA and PGV, component fragilities, and water pipe 
break ratios.  Engineers and decision makers may wish to know which factors are the 
most influential on the serviceability or functionality ratios in order to select proper 
modeling parameters or to target investments in additional data acquisition or risk 
management.  Such assessment is called sensitivity assessment. 
8.3.1 Sensitivity Assessment under a Scenario Earthquake 
 In order to assess the effect of a specific modeling parameter on the results, the 
effect of all other modeling parameters need to be integrated.  For example, to identify 
the sensitivity of the results to the local soil amplification factors provided in the 2003 
NEHRP Provisions (FEMA, 2004) vs those proposed by Hwang et al. (1997), the 
following two network analyses would be required:  
• Serviceability assessment using the local soil amplification factors proposed 
by the 2003 NEHRP Provisions and all possible sets of other modeling 
parameters, and 
• Serviceability assessment using the local soil amplification factors proposed 
by Hwang et al. and all possible sets of other factors. 
In the following sections, sensitivity assessments of the serviceability and the 
functionality ratios are performed to the water distribution system and the electrical 
power distribution system without considering infrastructure interaction effect. 
8.3.1.1 Water Distribution System 
Figure 8-10 shows the sensitivity of the serviceability of the water distribution 
system due to the attenuation relationships for PGA.  In all attenuation relationships for 
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PGA, the water distribution nodes located either in the northwest region of Shelby 
County, which is close to the epicenter of the scenario earthquake used in this study (e.g. 
nodes 23 and 26), or far from any water storage tank, result in relatively small 
functionality ratios compared with ratios at nodes located close to storage tanks (e.g. 
nodes 38 and 47).  When water distribution nodes are located close to the epicenter and 
























Toro 1997 (Serviceability ratio = 0.173)
Hwang1997 (Serviceability ratio = 0.166)
Toro&McGuire1987 (Serviceability ratio = 0.172)
AtkinsonBoore1995 (Serviceability ratio = 0.174)
Campbell2003 (Serviceability ratio = 0.174)
Toro2002 (Serviceability ratio = 0.176)
 
Figure 8-10 Sensitivity of water distribution system serviceability to attenuation relationships for 
PGA 
 
Figure 8-11 shows the sensitivity of the serviceability of the water distribution 
system to the attenuation relationships for PGV.  At all water distribution nodes, the 
functionality ratio computed using the attenuation relationship proposed by Toro and 
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McGuire (1987) is smaller than the ratio computed using the Atkinson and Boore (1995) 
attenuation.   Note that the Toro/McGuire attenuation relationship estimates a larger PGV 
for epicentral distances less than about 100km (Figure 4-3), a distance within which all 























Toro&McGuire1987 (Serviceability ratio = 0.153)
Atkinson&Boore1995 (Serviceability ratio = 0.191)
 
Figure 8-11 Sensitivity of water distribution system serviceability to attenuation relationships for 
PGV 
 
Figure 8-12 illustrates the sensitivity of the serviceability of the water distribution 
system to the local soil amplification factors for PGA and PGV.  At all water distribution 
nodes, the functionality ratio computed using the local soil amplification factor proposed 
by Hwang et al (1997) is smaller than the ratio computed using the factors in the 2003 
NEHRP Provisions (FEMA, 2004).  It might be recalled that  the local soil amplification 
factor for PGV proposed by Hwang et al. is larger for all seismic intensities (Figure 4-5), 
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while the amplification factor for PGA crosses the NEHRP amplification at around 
PGA=0.2g.  The results in Figures 8-12 and 8-13 show that the PGV is the most 
important factor for evaluating serviceability of the water distribution system.  This 
observation implies that the water mains, whose failure is determined by PGV, are more 
important to the serviceability of the water distribution system than water storage tanks 
























NEHRP (Serviceability ratio = 0.233)
Hwang (Serviceability ratio = 0.111)
 
Figure 8-12 Sensitivity of water distribution system serviceability to local soil amplification factors 
 
The sensitivity of the serviceability of the water distribution system due to the 
correlation distance for PGA and PGV is illustrated in Figure 8-13.  At all water 
distribution nodes, the functionality ratios computed assuming that the correlation 
distance b=0 km result in a smaller value than that computed under the assumption that 
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the correlation distance b=Infinity.  Considering the fact that system failure probability is 
larger when failure events of components are statistically independent (Eq.6-5), one can 
conclude that the water distribution system in Shelby County behaves more like a series 























0 km (Serviceability ratio = 0.120)
Infinity (Serviceability ratio = 0.225)
 
Figure 8-13 Sensitivity of water distribution system serviceability to correlation distance  
 
Figure 8-14 shows the sensitivity of the serviceability of the water distribution 
system to the assumed fragility of an elevated water storage tank and the water pipe break 
density.  At all nodes, the functionality ratios computed using the fragilities proposed by 
HAZUS MH (FEMA, 2003) are smaller than those using the ALA Guideline (ALA, 2001).  
The water pipe break density embedded in HAZUS MH is higher, at PGV>10 cm/sec, 
than that proposed by the ALA Guideline (ALA, 2001) (Figure 8-5), while the failure 
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probability of an elevated storage tank is smaller at all values of PGA (Figure 8-4).   This 
fact reinforces the previous observation that water pipes, whose failure is determined by 
PGV, are more important to the serviceability of the water distribution system than water 























FEMA (Serviceability ratio = 0.154)
ALA (Serviceability ratio = 0.191)
 
Figure 8-14 Sensitivity of water distribution system serviceability to fragility curves  
 
 To determine the modeling parameter to which the serviceability assessment of 
the water distribution system is the most sensitive, a statistical approach is applied, as 
summarized in Figure 8-15 (Recab and Shaikh, 2005).  The contribution ratios of five 
modeling parameters to the functionality ratio of each water distribution node and to the 
serviceability ratio of the entire system are listed in Table 8-5.   
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Step 1: Evaluate T=ΔA2+ ΔB2+ ΔC2+ ΔD2+ ΔE2. 
where Δ•: the maximum difference with respect to factor • 
  A : the attenuation relationship for PGA 
 B : the attenuation relationship for PGV 
C : the local soil amplification factors for PGA and PGV, 
D : the correlation distances for PGA and PGV, and  
E : the fragility curve and the water pipe break density. 
Step 2: Calculate the contribution of factor A as ΔA2/T 
Step 3: Repeat Step 2 for factors B, C, D and E. 
 
Figure 8-15 Identification of important modeling parameters 
 
The contribution ratios in red and in blue in Table 8-5 represent the most and the second 
most significant modeling parameter for the functionality ratio and the serviceability ratio, 
respectively.  The functionality ratios at all nodes and the serviceability ratio for the 
system are uniformly sensitive to the local soil amplification factors and the correlation 
distance.  In contrast, the effects of component fragilities vary widely from node to node 
(e.g. the second most contributed modeling parameter for nodes 17 to 19, while the least 
contributed modeling parameter for node 46).  Thus, it can be concluded that the local 
soil amplification factors, the correlation distance and the component fragilities all are 
important for determining the functionality ratio of individual nodes, while the local soil 
amplification factors and the correlation distance are important for assessing the 
serviceability ratio of the entire water distribution system.  The attenuation relationships 
for PGA and PGV appear to be less important for the serviceability assessment of the 
system as a whole. 
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Node 16 0.8% 4.3% 67.7% 20.3% 6.9%
Node 17 0.8% 6.2% 71.8% 8.5% 12.7%
Node 18 0.7% 5.1% 71.8% 9.6% 12.7%
Node 19 1.0% 9.4% 48.5% 12.3% 28.8%
Node 20 0.2% 5.5% 46.8% 40.1% 7.4%
Node 21 0.1% 4.7% 47.7% 39.4% 8.1%
Node 22 0.1% 5.5% 37.4% 47.4% 9.6%
Node 23 0.1% 4.6% 39.8% 47.2% 8.3%
Node 24 0.1% 4.2% 34.7% 50.2% 10.8%
Node 25 0.2% 3.8% 41.4% 44.2% 10.4%
Node 26 0.1% 3.8% 19.7% 74.3% 2.1%
Node 27 0.2% 5.3% 24.8% 69.1% 0.6%
Node 28 0.1% 2.1% 32.7% 64.6% 0.5%
Node 29 0.1% 3.5% 19.0% 75.4% 2.0%
Node 30 0.2% 4.9% 24.5% 68.6% 1.7%
Node 31 0.6% 5.5% 44.8% 47.1% 2.0%
Node 32 0.2% 3.7% 22.6% 71.1% 2.4%
Node 33 0.2% 3.1% 23.3% 70.8% 2.6%
Node 34 0.3% 3.5% 26.8% 67.8% 1.6%
Node 35 0.3% 4.8% 34.7% 59.3% 1.0%
Node 36 0.2% 2.8% 26.8% 68.5% 1.7%
Node 37 0.2% 4.2% 33.2% 60.1% 2.2%
Node 38 0.1% 4.2% 31.2% 62.4% 2.2%
Node 39 0.1% 4.5% 23.7% 71.5% 0.2%
Node 40 0.3% 5.5% 56.1% 35.2% 3.0%
Node 41 0.4% 5.3% 54.9% 38.4% 1.1%
Node 42 0.5% 5.0% 56.6% 35.5% 2.4%
Node 43 0.3% 5.1% 67.8% 23.5% 3.3%
Node 44 0.5% 5.9% 67.2% 17.9% 8.6%
Node 45 0.2% 4.3% 69.6% 22.1% 3.7%
Node 46 0.5% 5.0% 71.9% 22.3% 0.2%
Node 47 0.0% 0.8% 45.5% 53.0% 0.7%
Node 48 0.7% 4.4% 61.4% 25.3% 8.2%
Node 49 0.5% 3.7% 71.9% 21.7% 2.1%










8.3.1.2 Electrical Power Transmission System 
Figure 8-16 shows the sensitivity of the serviceability of the electrical power 
transmission system to the attenuation relationship for PGA.  In any attenuation 
relationship for PGA, the substations located either in northwest Shelby County, which is 
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close to the epicenter of the scenario earthquake, or far from any gate station exhibit the 



























Toro 1997 (Serviceability ratio = 0.529)
Hwang1997 (Serviceability ratio = 0.457)
ToroMcGuire1987 (Serviceability ratio = 0.516)
AtkinsonBoore1995 (Serviceability ratio = 0.534)
Campbell2003 (Serviceability ratio = 0.509)
Toro2002 (Serviceability ratio = 0.572)
 
Figure 8-16 Sensitivity of electrical power transmission system serviceability to attenuation 
relationships for PGA 
 
The sensitivity of the serviceability of the electrical power transmission system to 
the local soil amplification factor for PGA is illustrated in Figure 8-17.  Some substations 
(e.g. substations 9, 10, 12 and 13) located far from the epicenter indicate smaller 
functionality ratios under the local soil amplification factor proposed by Hwang et al. 





























NEHRP (Serviceability ratio = 0.476)
Hwang (Serviceability ratio = 0.563)
 
Figure 8-17 Sensitivity of electrical power transmission system serviceability to local soil 
amplification factors 
 
Figure 8-18 shows the sensitivity of the serviceability of the electrical power transmission 
system to the correlation distance for PGA.  Some substations (e.g., substations 9, 16, 27, 
32 and 34) are networked in such a way that they behave as if they are part of a parallel 
system.   Since a parallel system furnishes a lower bound on system failure probability 
when failure events are statistically independent (Eq.6-10), this explains why these 
substations indicate large functionality ratios when correlation distance b=0 km.   Other 
substations (e.g. substations 19 and 42), whose functionality ratios are larger when 
correlation distance b = Infinity, are connected in series from any gate station.  Such 




























0 km (Serviceability ratio = 0.506)
Infinity (Serviceability ratio = 0.533)
 
Figure 8-18 Sensitivity of electrical power transmission system serviceability to correlation distance  
 
As was done for the water distribution system, a statistical approach was applied 
to determine the modeling parameter to which the serviceability assessment is most 
sensitive (Figure 8-15).  The contribution ratios of three modeling parameters to the 
functionality ratio of each substation and to the serviceability ratio of the entire electrical 
power transmission system are summarized in Table 8-6.   The contribution ratios in red 
and in blue represent the most and the second most important modeling parameter for the 
functionality ratio and the serviceability ratio, respectively.  The functionality ratio and 
the serviceability ratio both are sensitive to the attenuation relationship for PGA and the 
local soil amplification factors in all cases.  The effect of correlation distance for PGA 
varies widely from node to node (e.g., the most significant for substation 19; least 
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significant for node 46).  Thus, it can be concluded that while all three modeling 
parameters may be important to determine the functionality ratios of the individual 
substations, the attenuation relationship for PGA and the local soil amplification factor 
are the most important factors in assessing the serviceability ratio of the entire electrical 
power transmission system. 
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Table 8-6 Contribution ratio of modeling parameters to the serviceability assessment of the electrical 
power transmission system 
 
Substation 9 84.8% 0.6% 14.5%
Substation 10 96.7% 2.8% 0.5%
Substation 11 98.5% 0.0% 1.5%
Substation 12 97.0% 1.1% 1.8%
Substation 13 98.6% 1.2% 0.3%
Substation 14 85.4% 10.8% 3.8%
Substation 15 83.3% 11.0% 5.8%
Substation 16 85.5% 11.2% 3.3%
Substation 17 41.4% 42.6% 16.0%
Substation 18 35.3% 51.1% 13.6%
Substation 19 22.6% 19.9% 57.5%
Substation 20 77.9% 16.5% 5.6%
Substation 21 77.7% 19.5% 2.8%
Substation 22 21.7% 65.9% 12.4%
Substation 23 27.0% 52.7% 20.3%
Substation 24 7.7% 67.7% 24.6%
Substation 25 83.9% 15.5% 0.6%
Substation 26 88.3% 10.8% 0.9%
Substation 27 78.8% 7.6% 13.6%
Substation 28 57.3% 32.1% 10.6%
Substation 29 21.6% 47.7% 30.7%
Substation 30 20.0% 72.1% 7.9%
Substation 31 19.5% 71.1% 9.4%
Substation 32 53.3% 27.4% 19.2%
Substation 33 16.7% 62.7% 20.5%
Substation 34 77.3% 13.7% 9.0%
Substation 35 87.3% 12.6% 0.1%
Substation 36 85.2% 14.8% 0.0%
Substation 37 11.9% 85.2% 2.9%
Substation 38 15.0% 74.9% 10.1%
Substation 39 32.3% 58.7% 9.0%
Substation 40 25.2% 61.6% 13.2%
Substation 41 16.4% 67.4% 16.2%
Substation 42 82.2% 13.2% 4.6%
Substation 43 26.3% 73.5% 0.2%
Substation 44 50.4% 48.4% 1.2%
Substation 45 82.2% 13.2% 4.6%










8.3.2 Sensitivity Assessment under a Uniform Seismic Hazard 
 Sensitivity assessment of the serviceability ratio and the functionality ratio is 
performed to the water distribution system and the electrical power distribution system 
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under the uniform seismic hazard at six return periods.  Infrastructure interaction effects 
are not considered.   
8.3.2.1 Water Distribution System 
 Figure 8-19 shows the sensitivity of the serviceability of the water distribution 
system to the six attenuation relationships for PGA.  The difference in the serviceability 
ratio is very small at all annual frequencies.  Thus it is concluded that the serviceability 
ratio of the water distribution system is not sensitive to the attenuation relationship 





















Figure 8-19 Sensitivity of water distribution system serviceability to attenuation relationships for 
PGA under uniform seismic hazard 
The sensitivity of the serviceability of the water distribution system to the two 
attenuation relationships for PGV is summarized in Figure 8-20.  The same trend is seen 
as PGA attenuation; the difference in serviceability ratio is very small.  The serviceability 
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Figure 8-20 Sensitivity of the water distribution system serviceability to attenuation relationships for 
PGV under uniform seismic hazard 
 
 
 The dependence of the serviceability of the water distribution system on the local 
soil amplification factors for PGA and PGV is illustrated in Figure 8-21.  The differences 
of the serviceability ratio are affected by the local soil amplification factor for PGV more 
than the amplification factor for PGA since the amplification factor for PGV proposed by 
Hwang et al. (1997) is larger than the amplification factor proposed by the 2003 NEHRP 
Provisions at all values of PGV.  Thus, the water pipe break, which is determined by 
PGV, dominates the determination of the serviceability of the entire water distribution 



















Figure 8-21 Sensitivity of water distribution system serviceability to local soil amplification factors 
under uniform seismic hazard 
 
 Figure 8-22 illustrates the sensitivity of the serviceability of the water distribution 
system to the correlation distances for PGA and PGV.  The effect of the spatial 
correlation of PGA and PGV is relatively large at small annual frequencies (e.g. 0.0002, 
0.0004 and 0.001-annual frequencies), but the effect becomes less important as the 



















Figure 8-22 Sensitivity of water distribution system serviceability to correlation distance under 
uniform seismic hazard 
 
 The impact of choice of seismic fragility of an elevated water storage tank and the 
water pipe break density on the resulting serviceability of the water distribution system is 
illustrated in Figure 8-23.   The two lines intersect at 0.0021-annual frequency because 
the functions of the water pipe break densities proposed by HAZUS MH (FEMA, 2003) 
and the ALA Guideline (ALA, 2001) cross at a PGV of 10 cm/sec.  Earthquakes at large 
annual frequencies (e.g., 0.009-annual frequency) generate mostly small seismic 
intensities, and at these small seismic intensities (<10cm/sec.), the water pipe break ratio 
in HAZUS MH (FEMA, 2003) returns a smaller break ratio than the break ratio proposed 
by the ALA Guideline (ALA, 2001).  Thus, the serviceability ratio using the water pipe 
break ratio by HAZUS MH (FEMA, 2003) is higher than the serviceability ratio using the 
break ratio by the ALA Guideline (ALA, 2001).  The explanation is similar at small 
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annual frequencies (e.g., 0.0002-annual frequency).  There, however, the difference is so 
small that the fragility curves and the water pipe break ratios have negligible impact on 


















Figure 8-23 Sensitivity of water distribution system to fragility curves and water pipe break ratios 
under uniform seismic hazard 
 
 The statistical approach illustrated in Figure 8-15 is applied to determine the 
modeling parameters to which the serviceability assessment is most sensitive.  The 
contribution ratios of five key modeling parameters to the serviceability ratio of the entire 
water distribution system are presented in Table 8-7.  The contribution ratios in red and in 
blue represent the most important and the second most important modeling parameters to 
the serviceability ratio, respectively.  As was seen previously, the serviceability ratio is 
especially sensitive to the local soil amplification factors and the correlation distance.  In 
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contrast, the attenuation relationships for PGA and PGV are relatively unimportant for 
the serviceability assessment of the water distribution system. 
 
Table 8-7 Contribution ratio of modeling parameters to the serviceability assessment of the water 
distribution system under the uniform seismic hazard 
 
PGA PGV
4975 0.0002 1.1% 2.3% 64.3% 30.9% 1.3%
2475 0.0004 1.2% 2.0% 66.2% 29.9% 0.8%
975 0.0010 1.2% 1.3% 68.1% 29.2% 0.2%
475 0.0021 1.2% 0.5% 72.5% 25.7% 0.1%
224 0.0045 1.4% 0.1% 76.6% 17.7% 4.2%













8.3.2.2 Electrical Power Transmission System 
 The sensitivity of the serviceability of the electrical power transmission system to 
the six attenuation relationships for PGA is summarized in Figure 8-24.  The 
serviceability ratio is more sensitive to the attenuation relationships for PGA at smaller 
annual frequencies than at larger annual frequencies.  In contrast to the results for the 
water distribution system shown in Figure 8-19, Figure 8-24 suggests that the difference 
in the serviceability ratio of the electrical power transmission system resulting from the 
choice of attenuation relationships for PGA is noticeable.  Thus, PGA attenuation may be 
























Figure 8-24 Sensitivity of electrical power transmission system serviceability to attenuation 
relationships for PGA under uniform seismic hazard 
 
 Figure 8-25 shows the sensitivity of the serviceability of the electrical power 
transmission system to the local soil amplification factors for PGA.  The large difference 
at 0.0002-annual frequency follows from the fact that the amplification factor for PGA 
proposed by Hwang et al. (1997) is smaller than the amplification factors proposed by the 
2003NEHRP Provisions (FEMA, 2004) at larger values of PGA.  The smaller 
amplification factor leads smaller estimated failure probabilities, yielding the larger 
serviceability ratio.  Overall, it is concluded that the serviceability ratio of the electrical 
power transmission system is sensitive to the local soil amplification factors for PGA 



















Figure 8-25 Sensitivity of electrical power transmission system serviceability to local soil 
amplification factors under uniform seismic hazard 
 
 Figure 8-26 shows the impact of correlation distance for PGA on the electrical 
system serviceability.  The effect of the spatial correlation of PGA is small at all annual 
frequencies, indicating that this modeling parameter has a negligible impact on the 



















Figure 8-26 Sensitivity of electrical power transmission system to correlation distance under uniform 
seismic hazard 
 
As in the case of the water distribution system, the contribution ratio, which is 
determined in Figure 8-15, determines the modeling parameter to which the serviceability 
assessment is most sensitive.  The contribution ratios of three key modeling parameters to 
the functionality ratio of each substation and to the serviceability ratio of the electrical 
power transmission system are summarized in Table 8-8.  Those in red and blue represent 
the most important and the second most important modeling parameters for the 
serviceability ratio, respectively.  The serviceability ratio of the electrical power 
transmission system clearly is most sensitive to the attenuation relationship for PGA, and 
at smaller annual frequencies, the local soil amplification factor for PGA is also an 
important modeling parameter.  It should be noted that the latest codes and regulatory 
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documents use the 0.0004-annual frequency (2,475-year return period or 2% probability 
of exceedance in 50 years) for earthquake-resistant design. 
 
Table 8-8 Contribution ratio of modeling parameters to the serviceability assessment of the electrical 
power transmission system under the uniform seismic hazard 
 
4975 0.0002 72.1% 27.4% 0.5%
2475 0.0004 84.0% 16.0% 0.1%
975 0.0010 96.9% 2.8% 0.3%
475 0.0021 97.0% 0.2% 2.8%
224 0.0045 91.5% 3.2% 5.3%














The effects of uncertainties and the impact of modeling parameters were assessed in 
this chapter.  The aleatory uncertainties of PGA and PGV were considered by modeling 
them as log-normal random variables; the median values were evaluated from the 
attenuation relationships for PGA and PGV, while the logarithmic standard deviation 
representing scatter in the ground motion data was set at the typical value of 60%.  The 
epistemic uncertainties, which come from the choice of modeling parameters such as 
attenuation relationships, local soil amplification factors, correlation distances, fragility 
curves and water pipe break ratios, were modeled using the event tree models. 
Considering the serviceability assessment under the scenario earthquake, the 
functionality ratios of facilities which either were located close to the epicenter or some 
distance from any supply facilities return were invariably smaller than the ratios of the 
other facilities.  Under the uniform seismic hazard, a serviceability assessment using only 
the characteristic earthquakes within the NMSZ, might underestimate serviceability ratios. 
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The impact of the choice of modeling factors on the serviceability assessment was 
also analyzed in this chapter.  The serviceability assessment of the water distribution 
system was found to be particularly sensitive to the local soil amplification factors and 
the correlation distances for PGA and PGV.   In contrast, the impact of the attenuation 
relationships, fragility curves and water pipe break ratios were relatively small at all 
facilities and return periods.  The correlation distance in seismic intensities was relatively 




SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
 
Civil infrastructure systems are essential to the smooth functioning of society.  
The operability and efficiency of such systems is made possible through interconnections 
with other infrastructure systems and by the availability of the commodities supplied by 
those systems.  The complexity of interdependent infrastructure systems can lead 
unpredictable performance following natural or man-made events and accidents.  
Understanding the nature of these interdependencies is an important starting point to 
avoid or minimize damage or disruption arising from localized failures in such systems. 
This study has explored the serviceability assessment of interdependent water 
distribution and electrical transmission systems from the standpoint of seismic risk.  The 
case studies have illustrated the significant contribution to risk of system non-
serviceability arising from its dependency on interfacing systems and the errors that may 
result if the seismic performance of each system is assessed without considering such 
interdependencies.  
9.1 Summary and Conclusions 
The serviceability assessment of an infrastructure system in this study has a 
number of following attributes, which represent advances in network evaluation over the 
approaches taken in previous research: (1) It addresses system interdependency effects 
explicitly; (2) It incorporates the effect of spatially correlated seismic intensities on the 
system serviceability assessment; (3) It examines limitations on the applicability of the 
uniform seismic hazard as a measure of seismic demand on the serviceability of a 
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distributed network;  (4) It compares the serviceability of an infrastructure system 
estimated from a scenario earthquake to that estimated from a uniform seismic hazard, 
pointing out the shortcomings of basing the serviceability on the latter hazard model;  (5) 
It examines the effect of aleatory and epistemic uncertainties for the serviceability 
assessment; and (6) It displays the sensitivity of the network serviceability to modeling 
parameters, thereby pointing the way to further data acquisition and development.  
The first attribute utilizes the following techniques of system reliability 
assessment: fault tree modeling, reliability block diagram, structure functions and the 
Floyd-Warshall shortest path algorithm.  The fault tree model captures the infrastructure 
interdependency effects simply and accurately.  The reliability block diagram and the 
structure function facilitate modeling the infrastructure system whose components are 
interconnected.  These techniques lead to an expression of system safety in binary form 
(e.g., 0: non-function, 1: normal-operation)   The Floyd-Warshall shortest path algorithm 
facilitates rapid and efficient evaluation of network serviceability following system 
damage by an earthquake.  Application of the system reliability analysis to the water 
distribution and the electrical power transmission systems in Shelby County, TN revealed 
that the functionality of key components may be strongly affected by the function of 
other connected facilities; in particular, the serviceability of the water distribution system 
is highly dependent on availability of electrical power, and power backup systems play a 
key role for ensuring continued function of the water distribution system.  Due to the 
installation of power backup systems, the serviceability of the water distribution system 
considering interaction effects from the electrical power transmission system increases to 
the point where the water distribution system behaves as if it is independent of the 
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electrical power transmission system.  The studies by Dueñas-Osorio (2005) and Dueñas-
Osorio et al. (2006a and 2006b) also evaluated the impact of infrastructure 
interdependency.  However, the graph theory has not been commonly applied in 
infrastructure system serviceability assessment, and the integration and interpretation of 
the graph theory estimates in the context of other system assessments may present a 
challenge.  Furthermore, those studies did not assess the importance of power backup 
systems. 
With regard to the second attribute, the assessment of the effect of spatially 
correlated seismic intensities on the serviceability of both water distribution and electrical 
transmission systems revealed that the performance of both systems was strongly 
dependent on the degree of spatial correlation.  Furthermore, the effect of spatially 
correlated seismic intensities on functionality of a facility is dependent on the facility 
targeted.  The accuracy in the estimate of failure probability of the water pipe depends on 
the segmentation of the pipelines as it relates to the spatial variability in the seismic 
demand.  Although the Floyd-Warshall shortest path algorithm decreases computing 
effort involved in serviceability assessment, refined segmentation of water pipes 
increases the computing effort.  A closed-form approximate solution to this system 
reliability analysis was developed, which is independent of the number of segments, 
reduces the execution time required for the Floyd-Warshall shortest path algorithm 
significantly, and yields a conservative solution that is sufficiently close to the exact 
solution to be used in practical system analysis. 
The third attribute was achieved through a comparison of the component 
functionality ratios evaluated by the use of contours of the averaged seismic intensities to 
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averaged component functionality ratios evaluated by seismic intensities generated from 
each earthquake.  This comparison suggested that the use of the probabilistic seismic 
hazard analysis as a basis for network serviceability assessment yields conservative 
estimates of performance only if the network is exposed to high seismic intensities over 
its entire extent.  Otherwise, the use of the probabilistic seismic hazard contours leads to 
estimates of network serviceability that are sufficiently non-conservative that they should 
not be used for decision-making.  A similar result, which was obtained when the 
serviceability of the electrical power transmission system was considered, confirmed the 
hidden risk of the use of a PSHA as the basis for assessing the serviceability of a 
networked system.  Since the infrastructure system serviceability assessment performed 
by Dueñas-Osorio (2005) and Dueñas-Osorio et al. (2006a and 2006b) was performed 
using seismic intensities taken directly from the USGS probabilistic seismic hazard map, 
the results from the earlier study may differ from those presented in this study, where the 
spatial correlation in intensity was taken into account. 
The forth attribute was accomplished by assessing the serviceability of the 
water .and electrical systems in Shelby County under a uniform seismic hazard 
established using both the New Madrid seismic zone and the background source zones, 
which are simulated from the results of the deaggregation analysis.  Assessing the 
serviceability of either the water distribution system or the electrical power transmission 
system on the basis of the maximum probable earthquake, which is often used as a 
scenario earthquake for purposes of system assessment, appears to result in a quite 
conservative estimate of the serviceability ratio of either infrastructure system compared 
with the exact serviceability ratio in a certain return period.  A serviceability assessment 
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using a mean scenario earthquake appears to be preferable for determining a retrofit plan 
for an existing infrastructure system or a design for a new system.   
The fifth attribute was achieved by integrating aleatory and epistemic 
uncertainties into the serviceability assessment of the water distribution system and the 
electrical power transmission system.  The median values of PGA and PGV at sites of 
components are computed from attenuation relationships for PGA and PGV; the 
associated coefficient of variation due to attenuation is assumed 60%, which is a major 
source of aleatory uncertainty.  On the other hand, the epistemic uncertainty, which 
comes from the choice of modeling parameters, is displayed through decision tree models.  
Accordingly, this study clearly illustrates the role of uncertainty modeling on network 
performance.   
The sixth and final attribute was to assess the sensitivity of the serviceability 
estimates for the water and electrical systems to the choice of modeling parameters.  The 
result of this sensitivity assessment revealed that the functionality of components within 
each system is affected by different factors at different return periods.  Overall, the local 
soil amplification factor and the strength of spatial correlation of seismic intensities are 
the factors that are most significant for estimating the serviceability of both the water 
distribution system and the electrical power transmission system.  Conversely, the 
attenuation model chosen for PGA and PGV appears to be unimportant for the water 
distribution systems.  However, the choice of attenuation model is important for assessing 
serviceability of the electrical power transmission system.   
The sensitivity analysis reduces the difficulty in selecting parameters or 
relationships for network risk assessment, as it allows the network analyst to focus on the 
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subset of parameters that are essential to achieve accurate estimates of performance and 
risk.   
9.2 Applications and Recommendations for Future Study 
The methods and the outcomes described herein appear applicable to the 
following infrastructure system problems: 
• The methods described herein for serviceability assessment of infrastructure 
systems are constructed from fundamental techniques such as fault tree models, 
the reliability block diagrams and the structure functions.  This fact allows the 
methods to be easily integrated into existing engineering decision models.   
• The serviceability assessment of infrastructure systems is often applied to 
estimate indirect economic losses to industries.  Thus, the proper evaluation of 
serviceability after an earthquake, allowing for inter-dependencies in systems, 
may enhance the accuracy of such loss estimates.  
• The proposed serviceability assessment methodology will facilitate decision 
making to increase the performance of existing infrastructure systems within a 
limited budget (such as by connecting facilities with new distributing elements, by 
building new facilities, or by retrofitting existing facilities or distributing 
elements).  Importance indices (e.g., Birnbaum’s measure or Criticality 
importance measure (Rausand and Hoyland, 2004)) can help establish priorities in 
identifying those facilities and distributing elements the early repair of which 
would most improve the serviceability of an existing system.  The importance 
indices can be computed using the results of the probabilistic analysis presented in 
this study.   
 188 
The present research also has identified some issues for future research: 
• Interdependencies at higher levels - those in telecommunication systems, gas 
distribution pipelines, transportation systems and computer networks – should be 
integrated into the serviceability assessment.  Not only the information such as 
locations, fragilities of components, but a careful investigation as to how such 
infrastructure systems interact is necessary; 
• The network serviceability assessment should take into account progressive 
damage states in facilities that reduce, but do not eliminate, the flow of 
commodities.  To achieve this, the Floyd-Warshall shortest path algorithm must 
be replaced by another shortest path algorithm (e.g., the Ford-Fulkerson algorithm 
(Papadimitriou and Steiglitz, 1998)) that allows partial function of key 
components to be modeled.   Experience has indicated that the Ford-Fulkerson 
algorithm requires vastly more data than the Floyd-Warshall algorithm that is the 
basis for the accessibility analysis in this dissertation.  Additional data, such as the 
capacity of facilities and distributing elements and customer demands, are needed. 
The capacity of facilities may be assumed, e.g., from the dimensions of water 
tanks, the number of seismically vulnerable electric components such as buses, 
circuit breakers and disconnect switches in an electrical power substation 
(Shinozuka et al, 1998) or the diameter and construction of water mains.  Also, 
customer demands may be assumed by the average consumption per person per 
day (e.g., 80-100 gallons of water per day per person at home (USGS, 2005)).  
Furthermore, the relationship between damage state of facilities and distribution 
elements and their residual capacities must be established.  Residual capacities of 
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components, in percent, may be assumed by the use of the relationship such as 
PGA vs. damage states (DS) and DS vs. residual capacities illustrated in ATC 13 
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